Influence shapes competition and cooperation in resource spaces

Learning Dynamics of the Influencer's Game in Resource Landscapes

Computer Science and Game Theory

Summary

People and groups often compete for resources in ways that depend on where they position themselves in a 'trait' space, like choosing strategies near rich resources. The authors created a new game model called the influencer's game to describe this competition mathematically. They found that under certain conditions, there is a stable balance or 'equilibrium' where everyone spreads out evenly. However, when parameters change, this balance breaks down, leading to clustering or cycles of competition. They tested their model on real data and also showed it works when simulated agents learn strategies with limited information.

What this means in practice

  • For platform designers: Model how user strategies cluster or diversify in competitive online environments with resource-like traits influencing visibility or success.
  • For ecological modelers: Predict when animal populations specializing in resource use will converge or fragment based on influence and resource distribution data.

Authors

Mark Lovett Feng Fu

Abstract

Across domains as varied as ecology, economics, and online platforms, individuals are incentivized to position themselves within resource-rich strategy spaces. In this work we introduce a new spatial game framework called the influencer's game. Within this new framework players' strategies are represented as positions within a trait space. Players then receive a share of a portion of a resource based on their relative influence at that resource's points traits. For the influencer's game, we show that there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium that exists under strict log-concavity of the influence kernel. Using the unique equilibrium we show that the stability of the system depends on the influence kernel's parameters, number of players, and the resource distribution shape. For any dimension we demonstrate a stability threshold that depends on both the scatter and curvature of the players. When this threshold is crossed, the symmetric equilibrium destabilizes and gives way to a variety of bifurcation types; including, specialist clusters, limit cycles, and sub-games that reproduce the larger game's structure. We ground these results using real-world data for resources as a demonstration of the game's application. Finally we extend the game dynamics to use multi-agent reinforcement learning and further show that the predicted bifurcation structure persists under partial observability and discretized strategy spaces. In all, the influencer's game provides a novel framework for predicting when competitive pressure drives convergence versus fragmentation with possible applications across domains.