Papers for

ecological modelers

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Influence shapes competition and cooperation in resource spaces

Learning Dynamics of the Influencer's Game in Resource Landscapes

Abstract: Across domains as varied as ecology, economics, and online platforms, individuals are incentivized to position themselves within resource-rich strategy spaces. In this work we introduce a new spatial game framework called the influencer's game. Within this new framework players' strategies are represented as positions within a trait space. Players then receive a share of a portion of a resource based on their relative influence at that resource's points traits. For the influencer's game, we show that there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium that exists under strict log-concavity of the influence kernel. Using the unique equilibrium we show that the stability of the system depends on the influence kernel's parameters, number of players, and the resource distribution shape. For any dimension we demonstrate a stability threshold that depends on both the scatter and curvature of the players. When this threshold is crossed, the symmetric equilibrium destabilizes and gives way to a variety of bifurcation types; including, specialist clusters, limit cycles, and sub-games that reproduce the larger game's structure. We ground these results using real-world data for resources as a demonstration of the game's application. Finally we extend the game dynamics to use multi-agent reinforcement learning and further show that the predicted bifurcation structure persists under partial observability and discretized strategy spaces. In all, the influencer's game provides a novel framework for predicting when competitive pressure drives convergence versus fragmentation with possible applications across domains.

Thu 12 NovComputer Science and Game Theory
The gist
People and groups often compete for resources in ways that depend on where they position themselves in a 'trait' space, like choosing strategies near rich resources. The authors created a new game model called the influencer's game to describe this competition mathematically. They found that under certain conditions, there is a stable balance or 'equilibrium' where everyone spreads out evenly. However, when parameters change, this balance breaks down, leading to clustering or cycles of competition. They tested their model on real data and also showed it works when simulated agents learn strategies with limited information.
Open → 2611.17148v1

Environmental feedback and networks shape cooperation levels over time

Evolutionary games on networks with negative edge-based environmental feedback

Abstract: Environmental feedback can fundamentally alter the game payoff structure underlying the evolution of cooperation. How feedback-evolving games interact with population structure under non-weak selection remains incompletely understood. We study an evolutionary game on networks in which each edge has a binary environmental state that determines the payoff matrix used by the two connected individuals. By assumption, cooperation tends to improve the local environment, which in turn favors defection, thereby creating negative feedback between strategies coupled with the environmental condition. We analyze the model under strong selection using a mean-field approximation, a pair approximation that tracks both strategy pairs and edge environments, and agent-based simulations. In well-mixed populations, the feedback can generate bistability between full cooperation and full defection, as well as sustained oscillations arising through a Hopf bifurcation. Sparse networks (i.e., with low nodes' degrees) can eliminate bistability, suppress oscillations, and produce stable intermediate levels of cooperation. The pair approximation captures these effects and generally agrees more closely with simulations on sparse networks than the mean-field approximation. Our results show that edge-based environmental feedback and network structure, such as density of edges, interact to determine whether the fraction of cooperators stabilizes or oscillates over time.

Sun 8 NovSocial and Information Networks
The gist
This paper looks at how cooperation between individuals changes when the environment connecting them can be better or worse depending on their behavior. The authors show that when cooperation improves the environment but then encourages selfishness, complex patterns like stable cooperation or ongoing cycles can occur. They find that when people interact in sparse networks, cooperation tends to settle at moderate levels. Their approach uses mathematical models and computer simulations to show how these patterns depend on both environmental feedback and how connected the population is.
Open → 2611.11029v1

Flow matching speeds up sampling for Bayesian inverse problems

Flow Matching for Fast Posterior Sampling in Bayesian Inverse Problems

Abstract: Sampling from the posterior is the central task of computational Bayesian inverse problems. The standard workhorse in Bayesian inference - Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) - is sequential, yields correlated samples, and must be rerun for each observation. Conditional flow matching offers an amortized alternative: a transport map, trained once on joint samples of parameter and data, that yields independent approximate posterior samples for any observation at negligible online cost, without new likelihood evaluations. We give a careful, MCMC-literate assessment of flow matching for PDE-based inverse problems with function-valued parameters. Exploiting the flow's tractable density, we derive computable accuracy estimates of the underlying approximate posterior in total-variation distance and Kullback-Leibler divergence and, moreover, propose a hybrid sampler that is asymptotically exact by Metropolization. We validate the accuracy estimates and demonstrate the amortization in several numerical examples, including electrical impedance tomography and a likelihood-free Lotka-Volterra model.

Thu 1 OctMachine Learning
The gist
Bayesian inverse problems involve figuring out hidden causes from observed effects, but this process usually requires heavy computation and slow sampling methods. The authors study a new technique called conditional flow matching that learns a map to quickly generate good guesses of hidden causes without repeating complex calculations. This method produces independent samples fast after training and can even be combined with traditional methods to ensure exact results. They tested this on examples like electrical imaging and ecological models, showing it works efficiently while providing ways to measure how accurate the guesses are.
Open → 2610.02377v1

Stable coexistence patterns found in ecological and game systems

Stable Coexistence in Ecologies and Games

Abstract: We study feasible stable equilibria of Lotka-Volterra systems and their higher-order extensions. We complete the classification of impossible ecological interaction networks with at most four species and extend several of these impossibility results to families with arbitrarily many species. We then show that these sign-pattern obstructions are specific to the pairwise Lotka-Volterra model: arbitrary prescribed growth rates and pairwise coefficients can be supplemented by higher-order interactions so as to admit a feasible asymptotically stable equilibrium. Through the correspondence with replicator dynamics, we interpret feasible equilibria of higher-order Lotka-Volterra systems as totally mixed symmetric Nash equilibria of symmetric multiplayer games, derive bounds on their number, and study their robustness under perturbations of the payoff tensors. We conclude by showing that every impossible ecology determines a nonempty open class of symmetric two-player games with no totally mixed evolutionarily stable strategy.

Tue 8 SeptComputer Science and Game Theory
The gist
This paper looks at how groups of species or players interact in stable and balanced ways, focusing on models that describe these relationships. The authors figured out exactly which small groups of species cannot coexist stably, and showed that adding more complex interactions can allow stability even when the simpler models fail. They also showed how these ecological models relate to game theory, helping us understand stable strategies in games with many players. Finally, they connect impossible ecological scenarios to games where no universally stable strategy exists.
Open → 2609.09286v1