Platform competition can help users when credibility is assessed reliably

Toward User-Centered Agentic Recommendation: When Does Platform Competition Benefit Users?

Artificial Intelligence

Summary

Recommender systems usually suggest items from only one platform, which limits user options. The authors study a new approach where user agents compare recommendations from multiple competing platforms and evaluate their trustworthiness based solely on feedback from used items. They find that having access to more platforms does not always help users, because platforms may exaggerate descriptions to attract users, and users have limited ability to verify these claims. However, when users can accurately judge platform credibility over repeated interactions, they can achieve better satisfaction from wider choices. Their experiments show this benefit depends on market size and how users assess credibility.

What this means in practice

  • For e-commerce platform developers: Design recommendation systems that incorporate user credibility assessment to improve overall user satisfaction in multi-platform environments.$Commercial implications: Enables new recommendation features for platforms to compete credibly, improving user retention and engagement in e-commerce settings.
  • For online marketplace operators: Adjust reward and reporting mechanisms to balance platform incentives and improve user trust across competing marketplaces.

Authors

Kehan Zheng, Deyao Hong, Qian Li, Jun Zhang, Jie Jiang, Hongning Wang

Abstract

Conventional recommender systems operate within platform-specific catalogs, limiting access to potentially valuable resources across platforms. We propose user-centered agentic recommendation, a paradigm in which user agents compare recommendations from competing platform agents, and formalize their interaction as a repeated game. Platforms strategically modify descriptions without changing intrinsic item value, while each user agent assesses platform credibility using feedback from consumed items only. Our analysis shows that expanded resource access need not improve user welfare: strategic misrepresentation and limited verification can offset the benefits of platform competition. We quantify when platform credibility assessment allows users to benefit from broader access despite strategic exaggeration. Our analysis identifies resource and reporting conditions that guarantee higher average welfare than the original platform with an interaction budget linear in platform count. Experiments on synthetic and Amazon-grounded markets show that credibility assessment can improve finite-horizon utility, while its benefits depend on market size and mechanism parameters.