Revealing lottery numbers can help or hurt school assignments

The Double-Edged Sword of Information: Revealed versus Hidden Lotteries in School Choice

Computer Science and Game TheoryMachine Learning

Summary

When schools assign students using lotteries, sometimes students see their lottery number and sometimes they don’t. This paper studies what happens if students know their lottery number before choosing schools, especially when students like different schools. The authors find that showing the lottery number doesn’t always improve school assignments and can sometimes make things worse. They also explore how giving students only some information about the lottery creates complicated effects.

What this means in practice

  • For school district planners: Decide whether and how much lottery information to reveal to improve fairness or efficiency in student-school assignments when preferences vary.
  • For matching algorithm designers: Incorporate strategic student behavior under different lottery information policies when building school choice assignment mechanisms.

A theory result. No direct application yet.

Authors

Parinaz Naghizadeh, Jingyan Wang

Abstract

In school choice, a lottery number is often used by the matching mechanism to break ties when there are more students who prefer the same school than the number of seats available. There has been growing theoretical and empirical interest in understanding the impact of revealing the lottery number to students. In practice, in recent years, the NYC Public Schools started revealing the lottery number to students to improve transparency. Theoretical findings from prior literature also suggest that revealing the lottery number strictly improves the number of matches under the deferred acceptance algorithm. However, these theoretical results are based on the over-simplifying assumption that all students share the same preference ranking for schools. In this work, we relax this assumption and allow students to have heterogeneous preference rankings. Under a game-theoretic model where student strategies form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we characterize scenarios where revealing the lottery number can either improve or worsen the matching outcome, measured by two metrics of match rate and social welfare. We further consider revealing partial information about the lottery, and demonstrate non-monotonic effects in the amount of information available to students. These results together illustrate complex tradeoffs induced by the lottery revealing policy.