Papers for
school district planners
Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.
Revealing lottery numbers can help or hurt school assignments
The Double-Edged Sword of Information: Revealed versus Hidden Lotteries in School Choice
Abstract: In school choice, a lottery number is often used by the matching mechanism to break ties when there are more students who prefer the same school than the number of seats available. There has been growing theoretical and empirical interest in understanding the impact of revealing the lottery number to students. In practice, in recent years, the NYC Public Schools started revealing the lottery number to students to improve transparency. Theoretical findings from prior literature also suggest that revealing the lottery number strictly improves the number of matches under the deferred acceptance algorithm. However, these theoretical results are based on the over-simplifying assumption that all students share the same preference ranking for schools. In this work, we relax this assumption and allow students to have heterogeneous preference rankings. Under a game-theoretic model where student strategies form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we characterize scenarios where revealing the lottery number can either improve or worsen the matching outcome, measured by two metrics of match rate and social welfare. We further consider revealing partial information about the lottery, and demonstrate non-monotonic effects in the amount of information available to students. These results together illustrate complex tradeoffs induced by the lottery revealing policy.
Top trading cycles handle matroid constraints and ties in preferences
Top Trading Cycles with Indifferences under Matroid Constraints
Abstract: We study the reallocation of indivisible objects among agents who may hold initial endowments and may be indifferent between objects. Each agent has her own set of admissible objects, and a matroid constraint specifies which combinations of assigned objects are feasible. The model contains the housing market, house allocation with newcomers who hold no endowment, and the assignment of students to schools under matroidal constraints at each school. For this model, we introduce the top-class trading cycles mechanism (TCTC), which extends the top trading cycles mechanism (TTC) to matroid constraints and weak preferences. When a trading cycle is selected, TCTC fixes each agent's top indifference class rather than a specific object and postpones the choice within the class to the end. TCTC is individually rational, Pareto efficient, and weakly group-strategy-proof on the full domain of weak preferences, and it runs in polynomial time. When preferences and reports are strict, TCTC is strongly group-strategy-proof. Together with a known impossibility result, our theorem establishes a maximal domain of school-by-school constraints for individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, and strategy-proofness.