Papers for
matching algorithm designers
Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.
Stable matching instances have unique prime factorizations and exact counts
Prime factorisation of stable-matching instances: uniqueness, simultaneous products, and an exact census
Abstract: Every balanced instance of the stable marriage problem with strict complete preferences has a unique finest partition into prime blocks, and that single partition simultaneously factors three different structures: the reachable execution digraph as a Cartesian product, the proposal-prefix antimatroid as a direct sum, and the stable-matching lattice as a direct product. The converse fails, and fails at every size from two on: two explicit families share the identical Boolean-cube execution while one is maximally decomposable with a single stable matching and the other is prime with n. Uniqueness yields an exact census, a recursion counting the prime instances at every size, under which exactly 88,478,208 of the 110,075,314,176 profiles with four agents on each side are decomposable and the decomposable fraction is asymptotically n! / n^(2n). The blocks are characterised as the square components of the mutual-rank filtration, so the partition is computable in polynomial time and the factorisation is a tool rather than only a fact.
Revealing lottery numbers can help or hurt school assignments
The Double-Edged Sword of Information: Revealed versus Hidden Lotteries in School Choice
Abstract: In school choice, a lottery number is often used by the matching mechanism to break ties when there are more students who prefer the same school than the number of seats available. There has been growing theoretical and empirical interest in understanding the impact of revealing the lottery number to students. In practice, in recent years, the NYC Public Schools started revealing the lottery number to students to improve transparency. Theoretical findings from prior literature also suggest that revealing the lottery number strictly improves the number of matches under the deferred acceptance algorithm. However, these theoretical results are based on the over-simplifying assumption that all students share the same preference ranking for schools. In this work, we relax this assumption and allow students to have heterogeneous preference rankings. Under a game-theoretic model where student strategies form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we characterize scenarios where revealing the lottery number can either improve or worsen the matching outcome, measured by two metrics of match rate and social welfare. We further consider revealing partial information about the lottery, and demonstrate non-monotonic effects in the amount of information available to students. These results together illustrate complex tradeoffs induced by the lottery revealing policy.