Random payoff games reveal how stable strategies appear in multi group settings

Equilibrium Statistics and Stability in Random Two-Population and Three-Population Evolutionary Games

Computer Science and Game Theory

Summary

This paper looks at how different groups of individuals with unknown payoffs adapt and settle into strategies over time. The authors study games where two or three groups each choose between two strategies, and analyze how often stable patterns of behavior appear. They find that the structure of interactions and how payoffs are randomly assigned strongly affect which outcomes are common and stable. Their results also show that adding more groups tends to increase the number of stable outcomes and makes predicting final behavior more complex.

What this means in practice

  • For game theorists: Gain formulas for the likelihood of stable strategy outcomes in multi-population evolutionary games with random payoffs for model design.
  • For complex systems modelers: Use analytical predictions of equilibrium types and their stability to simulate dynamics involving multiple interacting agent groups.

Authors

Zhao Song, Manh Hong Duong, The Anh Han

Abstract

Multi-population matrix evolutionary games provide a framework for studying adaptation and strategic interactions among heterogeneous agents. When payoffs are uncertain, however, analysing a specified game does not reveal how frequently different evolutionary outcomes occur or how their probabilities depend on modelling assumptions. We study two- and three-population games with two strategies per population and both within- and between-population pairwise interactions, with payoffs fixed during each evolutionary trajectory. For two populations, we derive equilibrium-existence probabilities and analytical stability results for generic games and three structured classes: diversity, exclusive, and avoidance games. For generic two-population games, independent Gaussian sampling of payoff entries and of replicator coefficients produces different equilibrium statistics. Interaction structure further distinguishes coexistence from attraction: diversity and exclusive games share the same interior-existence probability, but only exclusive games admit asymptotically stable interior equilibria. Avoidance games admit transversely attracting equilibrium families without locally asymptotically stable individual points. For generic three-population games under independent payoff sampling, we obtain existence probabilities for all equilibrium types and joint existence-and-stability probabilities for boundary equilibria. Monte Carlo simulations support the analytical predictions and quantify multistability, while phase portraits illustrate initial-condition dependence. Under the same Gaussian payoff-sampling protocol, simulations show a lower frequency of fully mixed equilibria but a higher frequency of multistability for three populations than for two.