Papers for
game theorists
Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.
Balanced n player games linked to complex equilibrium geometry
Nashtopes and their A-discriminants
Abstract: An $n$-player game in normal form is said to be of format $\boldsymbol{d} = (d_1, \dots, d_n)$ if the $i$-th player has $d_i$ options for $1 \le i \le n$, and is said to be balanced if $d_n - 1 \le \sum_{i=1}^{n-1}(d_i - 1)$. The Nash equilibria of the game correspond to solutions of the system of indifference equations for the game, with payoff differences as coefficients and strategy probabilities as variables. As such, the mixed discriminant of this system gives some information about which games could have an unusual number of totally mixed Nash equilibria. This mixed discriminant can be regarded as an $\mathcal{A}$-discriminant for some matrix $\mathcal{A}$ in the sense of [Gelfand--Kapranov--Zelevinsky 1994], and the convex hull of the columns of $\mathcal{A}$ is a polytope, which we call the Nashtope. We study this $\mathcal{A}$-discriminant for each balanced game format with at least three players. This discriminant is a subset of the Nash discriminant variety introduced in [Abo--Portakal--Sodomaco 2026]. We compute the codimension and degree of this discriminant for all balanced game formats, including on-boundary formats, using the Euler obstruction formula in [Matsui--Takeuchi 2011]. Our $\mathcal{A}$-discriminant locus corresponds to a special multigraded Hurwitz locus studied in [Pratt--Sodomaco--Sturmfels 2026]. As a consequence of [Pokidkin 2026], we obtain the codimensions and degrees of the irreducible components of the Nash discriminant variety for each balanced game format with at least three players, fully resolving Problem 3.8 of [Abo--Portakal--Sodomaco 2026].
Efficient algorithm finds normal-form correlated equilibria in markov games
Normal-Form Correlation in Markov Games
Abstract: There has been a surge of recent work on correlated equilibrium concepts in Markov games. However, existing results focus on concepts weaker than normal-form correlated equilibria (NFCEs), leaving open the more challenging question of computing such equilibria, which goes back to the seminal work of Papadimitriou and Roughgarden (JACM'08). Here, we establish the first efficient algorithm for NFCEs in finite-horizon Markov games with a fixed number of players $n$. In particular, with $S$ states, horizon $H$, and at most $A$ actions per player, it computes an $ε$-NFCE in time $S(AH/ε)^{O(n)}$. This is the first algorithm polynomial in $1/ε$ and the description of the game for NFCEs in an interesting class of problems beyond the normal-form setting. Moreover, under the usual assumption that recommendations are independent across states, we show PPAD-completeness---that is, computational equivalence to Nash equilibria---either in many-player games or when the precision is exponentially small. The key idea behind our approach is to run backward induction on a sequence of auxiliary stage games, but with the twist that in each step we compute a constant-expectation correlated equilibrium. This is a natural refinement of correlated equilibrium in which the conditional expected payoff from obeying is independent of the recommendation. In fact, our reduction goes both ways, establishing an equivalence between constant-expectation CEs and NFCEs in Markov games. For a fixed number of players, we observe that a constant-expectation CE can be computed approximately by combining linear programming with suitable discretization. In contrast, it is PPAD-hard in i) polymatrix (many-player) games at constant precision, and ii) two-player games at exponentially small precision. The latter result follows from an unexpected connection to rank-2 two-player games.
Polyhedral methods clarify complexity of cooperative game problems
Polyhedral Methods for Cooperative Games: Small Lifts and Hard Faces
Abstract: We study the computational complexity of fundamental algorithmic problems -- membership testing, separation, valid-inequality testing, and linear optimization -- over polytopes and cones arising from cooperative games (also known as pseudo-Boolean functions). A central obstacle in the study of such problems is that a general cooperative game on $n$ players requires $2^n$ values, so the input size is $2^n$ for a game with $n$ players, making these computational tasks theoretically trivial. Restricting to $k$-additive games reduces the input size to $O(n^k)$, making such games a natural target for meaningful questions about the existence of efficient algorithms. On the positive side, we give an explicit extended formulation of size $O(n^k)$ for the core of $k$-additive $k$-monotone games, allowing all four problems to be solved by a single polynomial-size linear program -- in particular, circumventing the ellipsoid method that is needed when building from earlier tractability results of Deng and Papadimitriou, or of Edmonds. For the cone of $k$-additive $(k{-}1)$-monotone games, we give a complete characterization of its extreme rays and derive the same $O(n^k)$ bound on extension complexity, yielding a geometry-based proof and generalization of a result of Billionnet and Minoux. On the negative side, we show that for $l \leq k-2$ the cone of $k$-additive $l$-monotone games is computationally intractable: membership testing is not in NP (unless NP\,=\,coNP), valid-inequality testing is NP-complete, and extension complexity is at least $1.5^n$. Our hardness results yield, as a special case, a result of Crama and of Gallo and Simone. Furthermore, our hardness results also explain the lack of any good characterization of the extreme rays of the cone of $k$-additive $(k{-}2)$-monotone games.
Stable coexistence patterns found in ecological and game systems
Stable Coexistence in Ecologies and Games
Abstract: We study feasible stable equilibria of Lotka-Volterra systems and their higher-order extensions. We complete the classification of impossible ecological interaction networks with at most four species and extend several of these impossibility results to families with arbitrarily many species. We then show that these sign-pattern obstructions are specific to the pairwise Lotka-Volterra model: arbitrary prescribed growth rates and pairwise coefficients can be supplemented by higher-order interactions so as to admit a feasible asymptotically stable equilibrium. Through the correspondence with replicator dynamics, we interpret feasible equilibria of higher-order Lotka-Volterra systems as totally mixed symmetric Nash equilibria of symmetric multiplayer games, derive bounds on their number, and study their robustness under perturbations of the payoff tensors. We conclude by showing that every impossible ecology determines a nonempty open class of symmetric two-player games with no totally mixed evolutionarily stable strategy.
Risk attitudes influence long-term outcomes in coordination games
Entropic Risk-Sensitive Evolutionary Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games
Abstract: We study risk-sensitive evolutionary learning dynamics and their long-run equilibrium selection behaviors in coordination games. Agents' risk attitudes enter through the classical entropic risk measure, which evaluates opponent-induced payoff uncertainty and feeds into noisy best responses under two standard revision protocols: best response with mutations and logit choice. We first analyze $2\times 2$ coordination games in both single-population symmetric and two-population asymmetric settings. In the single-population setting, unlike the risk-neutral case where the dynamics are known to favor the risk-dominant equilibrium, we show that risk sensitivity can change the stochastically stable outcome: a greater risk-seeking attitude favors the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while a greater risk-averse attitude favors the maximin equilibrium. Thus, the population's risk attitude may act as a control knob for long-run equilibrium selection. In both population settings, we also identify a robust regime: any super-dominant equilibrium is stochastically stable for all risk attitudes, under both protocols, and across populations. We further extend the single-population analysis to symmetric $k$-action games, which include symmetric $k$-action coordination games as a special case, under risk-sensitive best response with mutations. In this setting, we show that, for sufficiently large populations, sufficiently risk-seeking agents uniquely select the strongly payoff-dominant equilibrium when it exists, whereas sufficiently risk-averse agents uniquely select the strongly maximin equilibrium when it exists. These results show that entropic risk sensitivity may serve as a systematic mechanism for steering equilibrium selection in evolutionary games, beyond the classical risk-neutral benchmark.
Strategy model selection improves stability in multi-agent games
Rank Without an Oracle: Deviation-Aware Interaction-Rank Selection from Offline Multi-Agent Logs
Abstract: Offline multi-agent payoff models are estimated under a logging distribution but used on distributions induced by learned solutions and unilateral deviations. Standard held-out loss can therefore favor an interaction class that predicts logged play well while distorting strategic incentives. We introduce Selective Interaction-Rank Validation (SIRV) for finite games with known logging distributions. A training split fits nested payoff models and constructs a common union of all candidate deployment and unilateral-replacement distributions; an independent calibration split evaluates every candidate on this same union. SIRV returns the smallest rank whose simultaneous upper worst-target risk is within tolerance of the best upper score, and abstains when a declared target is unsupported or too imprecisely estimated. A common coverage event yields a finite-candidate target-risk bound and a candidate-specific coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) gap certificate. We also isolate an exact two-point off-support non-identifiability result. In a controlled factorial study with 2,048 independent games per family, empirical-Bernstein bounds reduce the median CCE-gap certificate by 42.5% relative to Hoeffding bounds on common returns, with a 1.36-point reduction in supported return. Under paired rank misspecification and in a separately generated congestion family, the SIRV-EB fallback rule lowers mean true candidate-selection CCE regret relative to ID-Mean, while retaining game-level losses. Across 384 games at $N=3,5,8$, ID-Mean-relative mean CCE-regret effects stay positive while certified return falls sharply under weak coverage. These results separate certifiable model selection from universal strategic improvement.