One woman’s strategy changes partner rankings in stable marriage markets

One Strategic Woman: Sharp Ranks and a Persistent Core

Computer Science and Game Theory

Summary

The paper studies a situation where many men and women are matched as partners, like in dating or job assignments. It looks at what happens when one woman strategically changes her preferences to get her best possible partner. The authors show math formulas describing how good partners the men and women get on average with this strategy. They also explain how much women’s choices can vary when they report their preferences truthfully in this matching game.

What this means in practice

  • For market designers: Clarify how individual strategic actions impact expected matching outcomes when participants report preferences in stable assignment markets.
  • For online dating platforms: Inform the design of algorithms to anticipate or limit individual preference manipulations in partner matching systems.

A theory result. No direct application yet.

Authors

Ron Kupfer

Abstract

In a balanced random stable-marriage market, one fixed woman manipulates men-proposing deferred acceptance to obtain her best attainable partner. We prove that the women's expected average true partner rank is asymptotic to $(\ln n)^2$, improving the previous $O((\ln n)^4)$ bound, while the men's is asymptotic to $n/(2\ln n)$. The men's and women's average ranks, normalized by $n/\ln n$ and $\ln n$, converge jointly in distribution to $(U,U^{-1})$, where $U$ is uniform on $(0,1)$. Under optimal truthful truncation, the span of women's average ranks within the reported stable core, divided by $\ln n$, converges in distribution to $U^{-1}-1$.