Papers for
online dating platforms
Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.
One woman’s strategy changes partner rankings in stable marriage markets
One Strategic Woman: Sharp Ranks and a Persistent Core
Abstract: In a balanced random stable-marriage market, one fixed woman manipulates men-proposing deferred acceptance to obtain her best attainable partner. We prove that the women's expected average true partner rank is asymptotic to $(\ln n)^2$, improving the previous $O((\ln n)^4)$ bound, while the men's is asymptotic to $n/(2\ln n)$. The men's and women's average ranks, normalized by $n/\ln n$ and $\ln n$, converge jointly in distribution to $(U,U^{-1})$, where $U$ is uniform on $(0,1)$. Under optimal truthful truncation, the span of women's average ranks within the reported stable core, divided by $\ln n$, converges in distribution to $U^{-1}-1$.
Decentralized matching improves outcomes with AI agents in simulated markets
From Preference to Reciprocity: Decentralized Matching with Empirically Grounded LLM-agent Based Modeling
Abstract: Bipartite matching is a fundamental problem in game theory and market design. Classical approaches such as Gale--Shapley assume complete preferences and centralized computation, whereas many real-world matching processes are decentralized, asynchronous, and shaped by sequential interaction under limited information. We propose a dynamic bipartite matching framework that combines large language model (LLM) agents with contextual bandits. In a simulated Chinese marriage market, economically grounded LLM agents evaluate locally encountered candidates, while agent-specific Logistic-UCB models learn reciprocal acceptance from realized proposal outcomes. The mechanism therefore separates two decisions---\emph{whom do I like?} and \emph{who is likely to like me back?}---without requiring ex ante market-wide preference rankings. We first validate LLM-induced mate preferences against the empirical conditional-logit reference across multiple LLM backbones. In the $50\times50$ matching experiment, Bandit-UCB achieves the highest mean mutual welfare (56.01 versus 54.87 for Gale--Shapley), a smaller gender rank gap than the classical baselines, and the fewest blocking pairs among the LLM-ABM policies. Learned acceptance models show economically interpretable gender-differentiated associations, while counterfactual setups reveal no systematic unilateral advantage from prior search knowledge. Overall, these results support the advantages of decentralized matching with LLM-based behavioral modeling and online learning under incomplete information for economic simulation and computational social science research.