Variable proof of work controls network spamming in dag ledgers
Decentralized network congestion control for DAG-based distributed ledger system
Cryptography and SecurityDistributed, Parallel, and Cluster ComputingNetworking and Internet Architecture
Summary
Decentralized blockchains and similar systems can get overwhelmed when too many people send transactions quickly, especially if some try to spam the network. The authors study this problem in a type of system called a directed acyclic graph (DAG) ledger, where controlling spamming is harder. They propose a method where each computer node has a changing difficulty of proof-of-work that depends on its behavior, making it fair and stopping nodes from dominating by spamming. They also use game theory to show this approach encourages good behavior among nodes.
What this means in practice
- •For blockchain network engineers: Manage DAG-based ledger networks to reduce transaction spamming and balance resource use fairly among nodes.
- •For distributed system designers: Use game-theoretic node behavior models to design congestion-resistant protocols in decentralized networks.
A theory result. No direct application yet.
Authors
Mayank Pandey, Rachit Agarwal, Sandeep Kumar Shukla, Nishchal Kumar Verma
Abstract
We propose a variable and behavior-based node-specific proof-of-work (PoW) model for a directed acyclic graph (DAG)-based distributed ledger technology (DLT) network to mitigate decentralized network congestion control. Network congestion control for centralized communication systems is an established field of study, with detailed and continuous research being done on the subject. However, attention to congestion control in decentralized networks is relatively recent and underexplored, especially with DLT, such as blockchain and DAG-based networks. For the DLT networks, the network congestion is caused by factors such as transaction spamming, an increase in the user base, and the launch of new tokens. We focus on the congestion caused by the spamming of transactions within the blockchain and DAG-based DLT network. Based on the network throughput of transactions per second and consensus procedure, the DAG-based DLT needs to control network spamming more than the blockchain network. The PoW model within the DLT consensus framework is a limited deterrent against spamming. Our model provides equal opportunities for all stakeholders regardless of their computational resources. It prevents and penalizes any node that attempts to spam or dominate the network with more than the prescribed number of transactions. Since the system nodes compete to issue transactions with finite network resources, we display the system behavior through a non-cooperative game. Further, we show that our model enforces prescribed behavior amongst the nodes through the proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium in the game.