blockchain network engineers

Abstract: Eclipse attacks isolate a blockchain node by monopolizing its network connections. Existing attacks on Monero (NDSS'25), Bitcoin (USENIX'15/21, S&P'20) and Ethereum (WWW'26) implicitly assume that the adversary can establish inbound connections, thereby excluding a large and practically dominant class of nodes: \textit{unreachable nodes} operating behind NATs. Such nodes are widely believed to enjoy stronger networks. We challenge this assumption and show that unreachability does NOT imply the expected resilience! We present the first eclipse attacks tailored to unreachable nodes in Monero's P2P network. Our attacks require no inbound access to the victim. Instead, they first poison the peerlist of reachable nodes, which subsequently act as propagation relays to contaminate unreachable nodes' whitelists. The adversary then exploits Monero's built-in outbound connection refresh logic to evict benign neighbors and eventually monopolize all outbound connections. We instantiate this strategy in two attacks: Nyx, which targets long-running unreachable nodes and achieves a complete and persistent eclipse through network-wide poisoning; and Moros, a stealthier attack that exploits the bootstrapping phase to rapidly eclipse newly joined unreachable nodes. We ethically evaluate both attacks. Nyx is validated via large-scale simulations on a Monero network constructed using the SEED Emulator, while Moros is demonstrated on the Monero mainnet against controlled targets. Our results show that unreachable nodes can be reliably driven into stable, long-lived eclipse states. We also propose countermeasures.

Abstract: We propose a variable and behavior-based node-specific proof-of-work (PoW) model for a directed acyclic graph (DAG)-based distributed ledger technology (DLT) network to mitigate decentralized network congestion control. Network congestion control for centralized communication systems is an established field of study, with detailed and continuous research being done on the subject. However, attention to congestion control in decentralized networks is relatively recent and underexplored, especially with DLT, such as blockchain and DAG-based networks. For the DLT networks, the network congestion is caused by factors such as transaction spamming, an increase in the user base, and the launch of new tokens. We focus on the congestion caused by the spamming of transactions within the blockchain and DAG-based DLT network. Based on the network throughput of transactions per second and consensus procedure, the DAG-based DLT needs to control network spamming more than the blockchain network. The PoW model within the DLT consensus framework is a limited deterrent against spamming. Our model provides equal opportunities for all stakeholders regardless of their computational resources. It prevents and penalizes any node that attempts to spam or dominate the network with more than the prescribed number of transactions. Since the system nodes compete to issue transactions with finite network resources, we display the system behavior through a non-cooperative game. Further, we show that our model enforces prescribed behavior amongst the nodes through the proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium in the game.