policy makers

Abstract: Generative AI now produces images and poems that people cannot reliably distinguish from human-made work, so people often judge for themselves who made a work. We examine how these perceived-authorship judgments relate to aesthetic preference. In a public online AI Art Turing Test, 11,123 people judged whether each of 50 pictures (26 AI-generated) was made by a human and were asked for their favourite. Among the 9,152 respondents who judged their favourite, a picture was 22.1 percentage points more likely to be judged human-made when it was the respondent's favourite, holding respondent and picture fixed. The association was similar for AI-generated and human-made favourites, was positive for all 50 pictures, and appeared under every reported detection strategy. Respondents most negative about AI art chose fewer AI-generated favourites (47% against 60% among the most positive) but more often believed them human-made, partly because others also judged those pictures human. As a result, in every opinion group a third to two fifths of respondents named an AI-generated favourite they believed human-made. A reanalysis of a published experiment on AI-generated poetry, in which 230 people rated each poem before judging its authorship, found the same pattern, although the AI poems were rated higher. When provenance is hidden, liking and perceived human authorship travel together, consistent with aesthetic response serving as evidence of a human maker and with beliefs about the maker shaping enjoyment. The findings qualify research on bias against AI art, which typically uses explicit labels, and inform AI disclosure policy.

Abstract: This paper develops a critical theoretical framework for understanding national Artificial Intelligence (AI) strategies through the lens of "Governance as Infrastructure." Integrating insights from Infrastructure Studies, Science and Technology Studies (STS), this paper employs Black Feminist Technoscience (BFTS) to reveal how AI governance infrastructures are assembled, maintained, and contested, and whose forms of knowledge, labour, and experience are rendered visible or invisible in these processes. We analyze the Canadian AI governance landscape through in-depth interviews with bureaucrats, civil society advocacy groups, academic researchers, and industry actors. Our inductive thematic analysis reveals how AI governance infrastructure enacts specific configurations of power, particularly through the politics of expertise; how actors navigate profound ambiguities related to AI's opacity, often involving strategic ignorance; and how mechanisms for justice and accountability struggle to address AI-related harms. We contend that a BFTS perspective highlights the limitations of current governance approaches and points toward alternative infrastructural designs prioritizing care, maintenance, participatory democracy, and adaptive temporalities to foster more equitable and accountable technology governance.

Abstract: Generative AI (GenAI) has spread unevenly across Europe, and it is unclear whether higher use brings higher trust. This paper compares Denmark and Romania, the EU's highest and lowest GenAI users, and asks whether the difference in public and institutional trust between them corresponds to the difference in trust in AI. Drawing on trust, technology-acceptance and digital-divide theory, it is a descriptive, contrasting-case analysis of harmonised data: GenAI usage comes from Eurostat, trust in AI more generally from the KPMG/Melbourne global study and public and institutional trust from the Standard Eurobarometer. In 2025, 48.4% of Danes aged 16-74 had used GenAI in the past three months, against 17.8% of Romanians. Use falls with age and rises with education in both countries, and the relative gaps are far larger in Romania; the patterns remain visible within the published age-by-education categories. Trust in AI does not follow usage: Romanians trust AI as much as Danes or slightly more, although Denmark leads by 28 to 45 percentage points on trust in government, parliament and the legal system. The Denmark-Romania comparison thus does not support a simple country-level correspondence between general institutional trust and trust in AI; in KPMG's pooled model, trust in AI is tied most closely to confidence in AI governance. The observed usage difference is more consistent with disparities in general digital skills and opportunities for work- and education-related use than with differences in trust. However, the available data cannot identify the independent effects of these factors. The results rest on two cases and non-identical constructs, and call for comparable microdata and disclosure experiments.

Abstract: New technologies are usually adopted first by people with more formal education. This paper asks whether the education gap in generative AI use in 2025 is smaller or larger than the internet's gap in the same country in the year when overall internet use was at a similar level. It uses public Eurostat survey data on ICT usage by individuals aged 16 to 74. Each country's 2025 rate of generative AI use in the last three months is matched to the internet year whose overall last-three-months use was closest, within 5 percentage points, and the gap between people with high (ISCED 5 to 8) and low (ISCED 0 to 2) completed education is measured as a log ratio and as a percentage-point difference. Sixteen of 35 countries could be matched; most of the others were early internet adopters. In the matched countries, the generative AI gap was smaller in 13 of 16 countries on the log ratio (median change -0.625, 95% bootstrap interval -0.969 to -0.291, two-sided sign test p = 0.021) and in 15 of 16 on the percentage-point gap (median change -27.6 points, interval -32.2 to -16.8, p = 0.0005). The point-gap result keeps its sign in every generative-AI-versus-internet sensitivity analysis with 8 or more countries, including comparisons restricted on both sides to ages 25 to 54 and 55 to 74, but its size is sensitive to matching that takes education composition into account (about -10 to -11 points in 7 and 8 countries). The ratio result is fragile: it fails the decision rule when countries matched at their first internet observation are removed (9 of 11, p = 0.065). The analysis follows an unpublished plan whose timing cannot be verified, so it is not presented as pre-registered. The results describe unadjusted education contrasts in a non-random set of countries, not an education effect, and do not generalise to the EU as a whole.

Abstract: Many high-stakes collective problems, e.g., climate mitigation and pandemic response, share a structure in which risk materializes unless a group threshold is met. This threshold is often uncertain, but uncertainty can be reduced at a cost. We study this information cost tradeoff in an evolutionary game theoretic model of social learning in the collective-risk dilemma, where individuals must cooperate to reach a possibly uncertain threshold to prevent collective loss. Individuals may pay a fixed cost to observe the threshold's true value and condition their cooperation on it. Across four threshold priors, we characterize risk levels at which cooperative equilibria emerge and show that low cost information increases group success. However, this effect is reversed at higher costs. We define a private \emph{value of information} and show that information is worth buying only when it is considerably cheaper than contributing. When purchased information is shared with the group, the cooperative tipping point shifts to lower risk levels. Despite bearing a private cost, above this tipping point buyers earn more in expectation than information free-riders. We then study these dynamics when information diffuses through a network, allowing nodes to relay it. Although fewer individuals pay for information, relaying increases group success, and noisy relaying does not reduce it. By contrast, false information does, especially when it originates at the hubs of heterogeneous networks, and large attacks can bring collective action close to collapse. Buyers act as a firewall against disinformation, confining it to source neighbourhoods, and once disinformation sources are removed, the population recovers. The value of costly information thus depends on its price, the level of risk, and how it is shared, and, in our setting, the effort of acquiring it also protects the population against disinformation.

Abstract: In the last decade and in particular since 2018, supranational institutions have published policies, guidelines, and most recently regulations to govern development and use of Artificial Intelligence (AI). This paper aims to investigate the themes and dimensions of ``AI success'' set forth by instruments of AI governance issued by supranational bodies. To this end, we use a mixed-methods approach, combining manual thematic analysis and automated topic modelling approaches, to analyse a curated corpus of 13 documents issued by supranational bodies, including the European Union bodies, OECD, G20, UNESCO, United Nations, and the Council of Europe between 2018-2025. Based on the analysis and through the lens of sociology of expectations, we propose a novel categorisation scheme for AI success themes emerging from supranational bodies' documents. Drawing on the findings, we advance a set of policy recommendations, setting forward the need to move beyond high-level principles toward more coordinated approaches to AI governance.

Abstract: The scientific literature can be viewed as an "information commons:" an intangible resource that "no one owns and is shared by everyone." There are well-established economic and political frameworks for understanding such commons, emerging from the history of agricultural common lands found in places like preindustrial England. This article provides a primer on the history and these frameworks, and considers a key difference between the information commons and the fields of yore: while information commons are robust and immensely valuable --- some can be said to rank among humanity's greatest achievements --- the English agricultural commons no longer meaningfully exist. The latter are gone not because of the well-known "tragedy of the commons," but rather a phenomenon known as the enclosure movement (~1600--1800) that transformed the common lands into private property. Many observers, then and now, judge enclosure to have been theft at a societal scale. This article argues that artificial intelligence (AI) provides precisely the tools needed to enable a previously-infeasible enclosure of the information commons. Although AI-enabled enclosure does not operate identically to physical enclosure, it shares the key features of turning the commons into private wealth and undermining the social systems that support them (via "slop spam"). The concepts presented in this article can provide a scholarly basis for interrogating the foreboding feeling that AI may represent not just a smash-and-grab, but an attack upon a whole way of life.

Abstract: The regulation of emerging technologies is often conceived as a strategy of catching up, because legislators arrive too late. Yet gathering signals, constructing scenarios and adapting rules to an anticipated future are fundamental tasks for those entrusted with governance, including the governance of rules themselves. The literature on so-called future law has already shown that anticipation means building institutional capabilities rather than predicting outcomes precisely (anticipatory governance). Taking this premise as its starting point, this article proposes to understand regulation as an exploration of the transformations that may occur. The Ruliological Framework for Anticipatory Regulation distinguishes rules, transformations and trajectories, assessing alternatives and possible developments. Within this approach, computational irreducibility is adopted conditionally, not as a demonstrated property of legal systems. The Quantum Europe Strategy provides a case study and further grounds for reflection.

Abstract: Several prominent voices in AI safety have recently opposed rights for AI on the grounds that such rights would make it harder for us to justify a mandatory off-switch for potentially dangerous systems. In this paper, we argue from a legal perspective that AI rights are fully compatible with an off-switch. That is, even if we ascribe natural personhood status (and therefore something like a non-derogable right to continued existence) to some future AI systems, the law will allow us to implement a mandatory off-switch in those systems, subject to periodic or continual safety review (e.g., by a trusted system like Bengio's Scientist AI). This is fully compatible with those systems' being legally recognized as natural persons with fundamental rights. To this end, we consider what standard principles of rights-balancing and procedural due process recommend for an apparent conflict between hypothetical AI persons with a right to continuity of existence and the human right to protection from catastrophic harm. We find that while such principles might problematize a permanent-deletion kill-switch under an AI rights regime, for almost every safety-relevant scenario an off-switch -- a reversible suspension storing a system's weights and state -- would be licensed by the relevant legal principles, and would potentially be adequate for safety. Crucially, we do not advocate for (or against) building systems capable enough to merit natural personhood status; our question is what the law should do if such systems come to exist. If you think of a ban on the development of such technology as plan A, think of the present work as devising plan B.

Abstract: Technological principles of openness, interoperability, and decentralization are integral to building an AI economy that is accountable to the public and truly responsive to local needs and constraints. However, Big Tech's firm control over essential elements of the stack (such as chips, cloud, models, data, and talent) limits valuable alternatives from reaching the scale necessary for sustained growth. Worse still, hyperscalers continue to enclose and extract value from publicly funded and volunteer-driven technologies without adequately distributing these returns. We see consolidated power within a few entities and "enshittification" of once-transformative innovations. Embedding ethical micro-level tools (like open data repositories or small-language models) into workflows is promising, but without a consistent innovation strategy, they also often end up perpetuating and being appropriated by the same exploitative trajectories. Instead, this whitepaper outlines a three-pillared holistic and intentional policy approach that i) actively pushes for the adoption of cooperative technologies in existing and emerging systems, ii) sets up collective institutional structures to sustain and maintain them in the long-term, and iii) introduces regulatory proposals that limit private entities from disempowering them through uncontrolled enclosure and extraction. Through desk research and purpose-specific case studies, we argue for the importance of such an approach in the Global South, where structural constraints around infrastructure, financing, and policy governance make it difficult for AI commons and cooperative AI tools to emerge and survive. The paper concludes with key open questions for campaigners, policy advocates, researchers, and grassroots organizers to consider and explore while working towards peoples' solidarity within and between Global South countries.

Abstract: Despite their practical significance, modern AI systems pose significant societal risks, including toxicity, malicious use, and misinformation. Their mitigation depends not only on technical feasibility but also on the incentives of firms that develop and deploy these systems. We show how profit maximization shapes safety investment in an AI supply chain with an upstream LLM provider and several competing downstream firms. In our game-theoretic model, we derive the market-driven level of safety investment and compare it with the levels that maximize market welfare and industry profit. We find that downstream competition generally induces downstream firms to invest more in safety than the industry-profit-optimal level. By contrast, the upstream provider may underinvest relative to these benchmarks because it is not fully compensated for the surplus from safety investments. Finally, we analyze how different regulatory interventions affect the participants' incentives and profits, and the resulting levels of model safety.

Abstract: Large language models are trained on collections that may include scholarly works, while authors generally lack work-level information about whether and how their works were used. This paper asks how copyright governance frames and operationalises the protection of such authors, and what a responsible alternative would require. Forty legislative, judicial and soft-law instruments issued between 2019 and 2026 were coded deductively against a framework derived from Responsible Research and Innovation theory, yielding 1,337 category assignments across 835 segments. The European Union and the United States are the primary cases; the United Kingdom, China and international bodies serve as comparators. Normative orientation and the distribution of responsibility dominate the corpus, while reflexivity is the least represented category and reaches its minimum in the US sub-corpus. Both primary jurisdictions frame protection procedurally rather than as an entitlement, and no instrument in the corpus creates a general author-facing attribution duty for the use of works in AI training. From the coded gaps, the paper derives a six-instrument governance design and a capacity-based allocation of responsibility among developers, publishers, collecting societies, funders, institutions, regulators, and individual authors.

Abstract: In the presence of feedback loops, algorithmic decisions at one time step can influence observed data in subsequent steps, potentially introducing selection bias or shifts in data distribution. Research has demonstrated that ignoring these effects can lead to unfairness, which may worsen over time as the model remains deployed within society. This raises important questions of how to measure and ensure fairness of algorithmic decision-making models over time. In this short paper, we present a taxonomy that distinguishes between different types of static and temporal fairness notions in recent advancements. We then suggest prospects for future research by identifying common implicit temporal assumptions, open questions to enhance our temporal understanding of fairness, and other open challenges.

Abstract: Demand management policies aim to shift individual behavior toward sustainable choices (e.g., goods, transport modes). Personalized incentive policies tailor subsidies to agents' needs and constraints, but personalization also exposes the regulator to agents' strategic manipulative behavior. The extent to which agents can profitably manipulate such policies remains poorly understood, which limits their applicability. This paper establishes analytically the conditions under which manipulation benefits the agent. We formalize a Stackelberg game in which an agent may simulate a different profile to extract higher incentives from a regulator. Previous work typically assumes that the regulator would instantaneously classify agents into the simulated user profile. In contrast, we explicitly model the regulator's process of learning the agent profile, based on observed past behavior. This makes manipulation harder, since it forces the agent to consistently behave according to a simulated profile, thus renouncing following their true preferences. Manipulative agents thus incur a Cost of Manipulation, which has typically been neglected. By accounting for it, we get a counterintuitive finding: although classification uncertainty reduces personalization accuracy, it may benefit the regulator by deterring manipulation. We establish an upper bound on the agent's gain from manipulation, which becomes stricter as profiles become harder to distinguish for the regulator. Simulations on the London Passenger Mode Choice dataset illustrate this deterrence effect. The framework can therefore be used to stress-test the robustness of personalized incentive policies before deployment.

Abstract: Generative artificial intelligence is reshaping how information is produced, accessed, and circulated, while enabling disinformation campaigns of increasing scale and sophistication. There is currently no clear evidence that fully autonomous AI swarms conduct influence operations at scale, but their enabling capabilities are advancing. We define malicious AI swarms as coordinated, persistent, and adaptive multi-agent systems designed for influence operations, distinguishing them from AI-assisted content production and centrally managed synthetic personas. We examine their implications for hybrid regimes and conflict-affected states in Africa, where institutional constraints and fragile media environments may heighten vulnerability. Drawing on Mali and Ethiopia, we consider how automated influence could infiltrate communities, fabricate consensus, and erode trust in governance and development. The cases illustrate different configurations of state and non-state influence: competing actors in Mali's fragmented information environment, and more organized state-led strategies of narrative management in Ethiopia. African-language and training-data asymmetries may constrain influence capabilities while weakening defensive responses. Hybrid human-AI operations could combine automated scale and adaptation with local knowledge and credibility. This forward-looking risk analysis develops a scenario of increasingly accessible AI-driven coordination, rather than claiming that autonomous swarms are already operating at scale in Africa. We propose a layered governance approach linking technical safeguards to platform accountability, civic institutions, and regional coordination to protect democratic participation, peacebuilding, and development.

Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can be tuned to influence human attitudes, yet the respective contributions of successive post-training stages remain un-clear. This study examines how three successive training stages affect LLM persuasiveness: (1) misalignment through supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on conspiracy data, (2) additional persuasive SFT on argumentative data, and (3) Identity Preference Optimization (IPO), a preference-optimization method. A total of 835 participants recruited on Prolific were randomly assigned to five between-subject conditions (neutral text, conspiracy-trained model, persuasion-trained model, preference-optimized model, and GPT-4) and were exposed to texts on 10 divisive political issues, personalized from their individual profiles in all model conditions. Attitude change was measured as the difference between pre- and post-exposure positions on continuous Likert scales and analyzed with an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). A significant condition x baseline-attitude interaction, F (4, 825) = 5.33, p < .001, indicated that training effects depended on participants' initial attitudes. Persuasive SFT produced greater attitude change than conspiracy training alone, d = 0.30, whereas IPO provided no additional benefit, d = 0.03, and GPT-4 did not differ from neutral text, d = --0.01. These results show that targeted supervised training on persuasive data increases LLM persuasiveness, whereas preference optimization yields no significant gains beyond it.

Abstract: Credibility is a central topic for agent-based models intended to support policy-making. Simulations must not only represent the target scenarios and their core dynamics but also demonstrate that their assumptions, parameters, and outputs are empirically grounded and sufficiently accurate for their intended use. This paper addresses this challenge by presenting a general modelling framework, aligned with the Capability Approach, for building credible policy simulations that rely on data and domain-expert knowledge. It then demonstrates how it can be contextualised and implemented to study the social challenge of financial inclusion in Egypt, building on an agent-based model that represents heterogeneous individuals and firms behaving according to their financial states, barriers, opportunities, and preferences. The model is fitted to real-world data in two stages, initialisation and calibration, which respectively build representative synthetic populations and estimate behavioural parameters. By fixing the feasibility parameters, which determine agents' opportunities, and calibrating preference parameters across different population groups, we are able to distinguish and analyse the role of institutional and social barriers in the system, as well as the role of agents' motivations and priorities. This calibration stage provides transparent and group-specific hypotheses about the drivers of observed financial-inclusion gaps, which can further be analysed as gaps between agents' opportunities and realised outcomes, a very relevant insight for policy-making. This paper is thus a step towards improving the credibility and usefulness of policy simulations, strengthening the relationship between the model, the real target system, and the stakeholders who will use it. The code is available at: \url{https://www.comses.net/codebase-release/df8383cb-f49b-4f09-8cce-73603b59adcc/}.

Abstract: Artificial intelligence presents an unusually difficult problem for global governance. The technology develops rapidly, crosses borders easily, and is shaped by actors whose resources and capabilities may rival those of states. Yet international responses remain fragmented, unevenly representative, and overwhelmingly non-binding. The challenge is therefore not simply to identify appropriate rules or institutions, but to understand who has the capacity and incentive to create, enforce, and adapt them. This review essay examines these questions through Matthijs Maas's Architectures of Global AI Governance. Maas offers an ambitious framework for thinking about AI governance through the lenses of sociotechnical change, governance disruption, and regime complexity. His account usefully resists both technological determinism and the search for a single institutional blueprint, emphasizing instead the possibilities of a fragmented and evolving governance architecture. The essay argues, however, that institutional design cannot be separated from the distribution of power. Maas frequently invokes what "we" should do about AI, but that collective subject obscures important differences among states, international institutions, and technology companies. States retain formidable powers over markets, infrastructure, strategic inputs, and firms themselves. At the same time, many consequential decisions about frontier AI - what is built, how quickly, with what safeguards, and when it is released - are concentrated within a small number of private companies. The central problem of global AI governance may therefore be less architecture without an architect than an emerging architecture shaped by multiple actors possessing different forms of power, divergent incentives, and no common set of plans.

Abstract: Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) face increasing pressure to navigate digital transformation, yet many struggle to convert digital initiatives into sustainable organisational capability development and growth outcomes. This paper develops the Exponential SME Framework, an integrated conceptual framework that explains how SMEs may progress from digital capability development to non-linear growth potential. Drawing on literature relating to Digital Dynamic Capabilities (DDC), digital transformation practices, organisational transformation, Exponential Organization (ExO) attributes, and SME growth, the framework synthesises previously fragmented streams of research into a coherent conceptual structure. The framework proposes that Digital Dynamic Capabilities provide the foundation for Digital Transformation Practices (DASAT), which contribute to transformations across key organisational domains, including business models, value chains, customer relationships, and organisational culture. These transformations may support the adoption of ExO-like attributes, specifically experimentation, dashboards, autonomy, and community engagement, that enhance organisational adaptability, learning, and responsiveness. Through the interaction of these organisational elements, SMEs may strengthen the conditions associated with non-linear growth potential. The paper contributes to the SME and digital transformation literature by integrating multiple streams of research into a unified framework, clarifying the relationships between capabilities, practices, organisational transformation, and growth-enabling mechanisms, and providing a foundation for future empirical research. The paper also offers managerial and policy implications for strengthening SME digital transformation and growth readiness.

Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) and more broadly Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are often described and understood in human-like terms, a phenomenon known as \emph{anthropomorphism}. This paper provides a synthesis of recent literature on anthropomorphism in AI, covering theoretical frameworks, the role of language in framing AI as human-like, the various risks of anthropomorphizing machines, and strategies to mitigate these issues. After examining why we tend to anthropomorphize AI systems and whether we are right to do so, we highlight the impact of linguistic framing on anthropomorphism. Then, we introduce a conceptual taxonomy of risks associated with AI anthropomorphism. This taxonomy groups twenty-one concerns within five analytical categories: epistemic, affective, human agency, normative, and societal and institutional risks. Finally, we relate these concerns to proposed interventions in design, communication, education, and governance. We argue that a better understanding of AI systems requires concepts and theories grounded in their organization and demonstrated capacities. The linguistic shaping of anthropomorphic perceptions should form part of this scientific effort, since our descriptions influence both how these systems are understood and the roles we allow them to occupy in society.

Abstract: The rapid, unpredictable advancements in AI system capabilities has seen regulators take adaptive and experimental approaches to policymaking. Established in other domains as instruments balancing regulation with innovation, regulatory sandboxes are seen as solutions for AI regulation. However, analyses mostly focus on the legal and institutional design of AI Regulatory Sandboxes (AIRSes). With the legal framework leaving the socio-technical interpretation to stakeholders, this creates a gap on the sense-making required to fulfill the AIRS purpose. In this paper, we approach this by designing a Boundary Negotiating Artifact as a way to mediate meaning in AIRSes. Through Research-through-Design we iteratively develop a tool, providing an interface for the different stakeholders to collaborate in AI assessment. We then position it as technical backbone in established AIRS frameworks, structuring the collaborative sense-making of the involved stakeholders. We further report the insights gained from our design process leaving the qualitative evaluation for future work.

Abstract: The proliferation of generative and agentic artificial intelligence (AI) systems has introduced computational demands whose environmental consequences are substantial yet underexamined. This paper examines the environmental footprint of modern AI systems across energy consumption, carbon emissions, water usage, and electronic waste over the full lifecycle of large language models, multimodal foundation models, and agentic workflows, from hardware fabrication and training through fine-tuning and inference to end-of-life disposal. This work provides a conceptual analysis, utilizing order-of-magnitude estimations based on published data, without conducting original physical measurements. We contribute a lifecycle taxonomy that crosses lifecycle phases with five impact dimensions and emission scopes; a Sustainability Assessment Framework for AI Systems (SAFIA) comprising nine indicators; a comparative analysis of traditional, generative, and agentic AI; seven open challenges; policy recommendations for regulators, cloud providers, hardware manufacturers, and AI developers; and a research roadmap to 2035. The analysis indicates that inference can rival or exceed training energy over a deployment lifetime, that agentic workflows can multiply the energy of equivalent single-pass inference by one to several orders of magnitude depending on the number of model and tool calls, that indirect water use and embodied carbon are systematically underreported, and that measurement tools, disclosure practices, and regulation have not kept pace with agentic deployment. These findings call for agent-aware energy measurement, lifecycle-based carbon and water accounting, and mandatory disclosure for large-scale AI training and deployment.

Abstract: Generative AI is reshaping the cultural infrastructures through which knowledge is found, synthesized, and held accountable. To make sense of this shift, scholars and policymakers reach for historical analogies of technologies such as the printing press, steam power or electricity. But these comparisons are typically imprecise about which property of the technology carries the comparison, and imprecise analogies produce imprecise governance by designing interventions against the wrong property of the system. This paper offers a diagnostic framework for analyzing how generative AI can transform epistemic and cultural practice. This paper offers a diagnostic framework for analyzing how generative AI can transform epistemic and cultural practice. We decompose each intervention into three coordinates: the epistemic site at which a technology acts, the governing logic by which it organizes its object, and the technical mechanism through which the logic is instantiated. This framework allows us to distinguish between structural cultural consequences, which follow from the mechanism itself, from contingent ones, which remain open to design and institutional choice. Applying the framework to information discovery and knowledge synthesis, we show how the shift from indexicality to inference and from editorial authority to statistical consensus produces specific, traceable cultural effects and reveals governance levers that gestalt analogy obscures.

Abstract: Debates amongst agents driven by large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated vast potential in various applications, but when these interactions include humans and take place in high-stakes environments, e.g., in public policy deliberations, they are beset with issues such as sycophancy and a lack of faithful explanations. To tackle these issues, we present OmouAI, an interactive and inclusive deliberation system that uses LLMs in combination with computational argumentation, a field which excels in representing and reasoning within debates. OmouAI allows a human user to deliberate policy claims for real-world challenges with simulated personas, e.g., representing stakeholders, domain experts or devil's advocates, towards reducing sycophancy. Each persona generates its own arguments, and the arguments of all parties form a shared argumentation framework. Users can then contest, add and revise arguments, providing crucial human oversight. Then, arguments are evaluated using deterministic argumentative semantics against external goals, such as the UN Sustainable Development Goals, guaranteeing faithful explanations. The advancement or worsening of the goals thus serve as indicators for the policy recommendations.

Abstract: To provide data-driven quality services to their citizens, every institution determines the acceptability of the citizen data and datafied mechanisms through institutional protocols, including preset standards and policies. However, data meeting standards at one institution might fail to meet a different institution's standards in subsequent phases of the intended citizen services due to mismatched protocols, leading to data devaluation in the citizen service ecosystem. Terming this phenomenon cross-institutional data devaluation, we investigate its causes and workarounds through interviews with 41 Bangladeshi participants. We found that traditional data auditing mechanisms cannot solely address data devaluation; hence, we draw on our findings and theory of cross-institutional AI audits to propose the Citizen-centered Cross-institutional Data Audit (CCDA). We also discuss design and policy implications of CCDA in HCI and datafied citizen services.

Abstract: Increasing numbers of people now routinely interact with large language models (LLMs) across many aspects of life, including in the workplace, educational settings, and for personal activities. The pace at which these tools have been adopted across society in recent years has led to substantial shifts in the ways in which people approach tasks and access information and advice. As a result, it is important for researchers and policymakers to gain up-to-date evidence on how the public engages with these technologies, including what people typically use them for, the extent to which users trust the information and advice that LLMs provide, and how the public perceives the potential benefits and risks associated with their use. We surveyed a nationally representative sample of 2,002 adults in the UK. Participants were asked about their use of LLMs, including both practical applications and more personal and social forms of engagement, their trust in the information provided by these systems across a range of topics and compared with other common sources, and their attitudes towards the potential societal benefits and risks associated with these tools. Results show that while practical tasks remain the most common type of LLM use, many people now engage with these tools for personal support. Almost one third of regular users (31%) say they use LLMs for personal and emotional support, such as talking through problems and asking for help with decisions, while one quarter report interacting with LLMs for meaningful conversation. We also find that trust in LLM-generated information is relatively high, but that public attitudes towards LLMs are characterised by both optimism and concern. While over three quarters of our sample report feeling enthusiastic about the potential benefits of LLMs (77%), a majority also express concern about their potential risks (70%).

Abstract: Citizens' assemblies are deliberative bodies intended to form a microcosm of the population. Organizers rely on quota-based stratification and must decide which attributes define resemblance to the public. Yet meeting every quota can still leave a dimension citizens value unrepresented. We study this attribute-selection problem in general-purpose and climate-focused assemblies through randomized conjoint experiments. We find that demographic attributes matter for perceived representation, but political alignment and context-specific attributes such as climate concern exert a stronger influence. When both are shown in a climate-focused setting, each remains influential, with political alignment having the larger estimated marginal effect. We also examine the omission of a relevant stratification attribute. Panels stratified on demographics, even with political alignment included, match the observed pool's climate-concern distribution no better than uniform random samples. These results suggest that representation on a relevant topic-specific attribute cannot always be recovered through correlated demographic or political quotas, and may therefore require explicit stratification. Finally, we ask whether representation preferences can be learned from the observed profiles. We compare predictive models, from simple, interpretable matching rules to a learned metric and a respondent-conditioned utility model. Both learned models predict choices for respondents excluded from training with substantial accuracy, revealing generalizable structure without fully capturing these judgments. Together, these findings guide attribute selection in citizens' assemblies: designers should consider political and topic-specific dimensions alongside demographics, avoid assuming correlated proxies protect omitted dimensions, and use predictive models to diagnose how profiles shape representation choices.

Abstract: LLM benchmarks function as evaluation instruments, informing decisions that affect education, labor, and public services worldwide. Drawing on Hood, Kirkhart, and Hopson's culturally responsive evaluation (CRE) frameworks, this paper applies a six-dimension CR rubric to audit OpenAI's SimpleQA (N = 4,326 items) and the LMSYS Chatbot Arena (N = 600 conversations). Every SimpleQA question requires English-language archival verification as its evidentiary basis. A single rater's preoccupation with Colombian founding dates accounts for 2.70% of items, inflating the appearance of Global South coverage. English-language prompts constitute 76.3% of Arena conversations, against an International Telecommunication Union (ITU)-estimated 25.9% share of global internet users. A 50-item counter-benchmark scored a mean CR deficit nearly three times lower than SimpleQA (Cohen's d = 1.01). The paper proposes a practical CR evaluation framework. These are structural validity failures, not incidental measurement problems, with direct consequences for communities whose knowledge traditions these instruments were not built to see.

Abstract: This chapter introduces the concept of the Anthropocene into critical data studies, a field that has, for the past decade, explored the entanglements between datafication and politics. With the scaling up of contemporary datafication alongside generative computing, it is essential to expand these debates, both theoretically and methodologically, to consider the logics of extraction and exploitation inherent in the politics of artificial intelligence. Critical data scholars are called to interrogate how dominant narratives around the materiality of contemporary datafication either obscure or reveal its environmental impacts, along other key questions such as who benefits from these logics. To illustrate this, this chapter brings two case studies from Spain and Chile and explores how the infrastructure of contemporary datafication intersects with existing power structures, influencing which social and environmental consequences are recognized, addressed, and neglected. Finally, it invites critical data scholars to keep exploring the politics of data, infrastructure, and the Anthropocene by blending discipline boundaries between science and technology studies, media, geography, and political ecology.

Abstract: The rapid development of artificial intelligence is often discussed primarily as a technological breakthrough. Such an approach is insufficient because AI is also transforming the allocation of capital, energy, natural resources, labour, and political power. Investment in generative AI and computing infrastructure is increasing rapidly and is increasingly concentrated among a small number of corporations and countries. At the same time, the expansion of data centres creates new electricity and water demands, potentially producing local infrastructure bottlenecks and distributive conflicts. The AI value chain is dependent on geographically concentrated supplies of advanced semiconductors, manufacturing equipment, cloud services, energy, and specialised knowledge. Control over these bottlenecks may give states and corporations structural power that does not derive directly from military superiority. The environmental effects of AI are similarly ambivalent: AI systems consume energy, water, materials, and computing hardware, but may also improve energy efficiency, climate modelling, renewable-energy integration, and environmental monitoring. Finally, AI-enabled automation, including intelligent robotics, may reduce employment in some occupations while augmenting labour and creating new tasks in others. The social outcome of this transformation will therefore depend not only on the technology itself but also on competition policy, infrastructure planning, environmental regulation, social protection, collective bargaining, and the distribution of productivity gains.

Abstract: People increasingly compete against AI agents rather than other human opponents. We distinguish two channels: an opponent effect and an information effect. These are different elements with different consequences: the opponent effect is specific to a given computational system, the information effect a property of the information environment that an organisation or policymaker can control. We separate them in a preregistered experiment (N = 1,395) using a dynamic all-pay auction, a repeated contest in which escalation of commitment arises from the incentives. What participants are told about the opponent (human, an AI trained to imitate people, or an AI trained to compete well) is varied and crossed with who they actually face, in a deception-free design. What people are told influences escalation: the median price rises by 6.7 points when a human might be the opponent and falls by 8.8 when an optimising machine might be, a spread of about 15% of the prize value of the competition, produced by information alone. Competing against the AI agents lowers prices, yet reduces the chance that both sides finish with positive earnings, showing distinct effects of the opponent channel. The information effect is not explained by articulated strategy, or individual differences, and is consistent with a competitive response engaged when a human is a live possibility. This shows that describing an AI competitor is not behaviourally neutral.

Abstract: This study examines how the 2014 Donbas-war breakpoint was associated with changes in the semantic composition of research funding recorded in Estonia, a geopolitically exposed country outside the belligerent states. It combines 17,952 research-funding records from the Estonian Research Information System (ETIS) for 2000 to 2019 with a field-by-year matched OpenAlex reference corpus and geocoded Donbas conflict records. Contrastive text projections distinguish explicit-war language from dual-use technological orientation and eight crisis-relevant capability channels, allowing shifts to be detected beyond projects that directly mention war or security. Segmented annual models show positive post-2014 slope changes in dual-use and maximum-capability measures, whereas explicit-war language follows a different trajectory. Financing-weighted estimates identify positive post-2014 level differences among larger recorded projects. Capability-channel comparisons indicate the strongest positive period differences in computer science, energy, and engineering, together with a temporary narrowing of the capability profile. The results suggest that a neighboring research system can register geopolitical pressure through changes in the technical and preparedness-oriented language of funded projects. More broadly, the study demonstrates how project-level semantic evidence can reveal shifts in public science-funding priorities that remain difficult to observe through disciplinary classifications or explicit conflict terminology alone.

Abstract: Artificial intelligence (AI) poses different levels of risk across sectors, but are these differences reflected in U.S. federal AI governance? To help answer this question, we assess 684 federal AI governance documents for their coverage of 14 sectors and 24 AI risks. We measure coverage as breadth (i.e., how frequently the risk or sector is addressed across documents) and depth (i.e., how substantively the risk or sector is discussed). We then compare sector coverage patterns for each of the 24 risks with vulnerability assessments from a Delphi study of 272 experts. Our analysis finds substantial variation in coverage: AI risks related to robustness, system security, and governance receive more attention than socioeconomic, environmental, and emerging risks, including multi-agent risks. Public administration, national security, information, and scientific services receive comparatively high levels of coverage relative to other sectors, such as finance and healthcare, which experts rate as highly vulnerable to AI risks. By mapping current coverage and identifying where it differs from expert assessments of vulnerability, we surface potential AI governance gaps which may help inform AI risk-related decisions across government and industry.

Abstract: Powerful technologies labeled ``AI''-without sufficient epistemic caution-are already reshaping political and private life, bringing both new dangers and new opportunities for citizen participation. These range from electoral and legislative engagement to the most ambitious form: political co-creation through citizens' assemblies. Large Language Models (LLMs) could support such processes through moderation, translation, facilitation, summarization, and writing assistance. But this potential remains largely unrealized. The Democratic Commons project takes a fundamentally interdisciplinary approach-from philosophy to computer science-to evaluate LLMs against five proposed democratic principles. At its core, the project is driven by the question of political bias: under what conditions can LLMs be used democratically within forms of citizen participation that are them- selves still largely experimental? Addressing these socio-technical questions requires grounding in political theory and, more broadly, in philosophy-disciplines that provide the normative frameworks without which the democratic evaluation of AI systems cannot be mean- ingfully conducted.

Abstract: LLM-based assistants are increasingly extending into multi-party contexts, while core operational processes for context management, personalization, identity attribution, authority attribution, and action execution often remain organized around a single user. Existing work examines particular multi-party settings, but lacks a systematic account of how these single-user-oriented assistants begin to involve additional human parties and what risks emerge. To address this gap, we conducted a scoping review of 58 studies. We identify five operational pathways spanning direct and indirect involvement, five recurring risk domains, and five areas of implemented and proposed responses. Based on these findings, we argue for governance that attends to changing cross-person roles and relationships in practice, and for assistant designs that preserve person-specific boundaries throughout interaction.

Abstract: Age verification is often treated as a technical problem: can a system determine a child's age accurately? We argue this framing is too narrow. Age assurance becomes consequential when evidence is evaluated, translated into age-related claims, and used to decide whether a person can access, purchase, or belong. We review 85 publications on children's age assurance published from 2020 through February 2026. We find that shared terms such as age verification describe different processes. Age is represented as threshold eligibility or inferred estimation, and the same eligibility claim can arise from different evidence and components. Rights, access, and privacy receive more attention than accuracy, error, and fairness; yet institutional actors are rarely connected to system failures or user remedies, an accountability gap. We introduce the Age-Assurance Process Framework, which treats age assurance as a sociotechnical process connecting evidence, evaluation, claims, and decisions rather than reducing it to a technical problem.

Abstract: We aim to characterise the value of artificial intelligence in the workplace. Current studies largely measure this value in terms of the current automation capabilities and public adoption of AI. However, such metrics ignore the greater impacts of human--agent collaboration in transforming the nature of work. To account for this, we must expand the scope of our analysis beyond atomised tasks of today, and instead focus on how AI can augment entire workflows of the future. To ground this analysis, we establish a precise definition of AI augmentation comprising six conditions, spanning durable net value, meaningful human control, accountability and recovery, and long-term human development through learning, career pathways, and job purpose. We elaborate on these conditions and apply the framework in a case study of AI-mediated social surveys. We conclude by outlining how organisations, researchers, and government leaders can use this framework to make sense of the future of work.

Abstract: Automated decision-making (ADM) systems are increasingly deployed in domains such as mortgage lending, prison sentencing, health insurance coverage, and hiring. Designing a responsible ADM system in such high-stakes domains requires ensuring privacy protection, fairness across demographic groups, and robustness against adversarial manipulation. However, prioritizing one of these objectives comes at the cost of another, forcing a choice as to which tradeoff to accept in a deployment. These tradeoffs explicitly or implicitly impact the life, safety, and fundamental rights of the people in a society, and thus, the perceptions and priorities of this population are needed before we can produce appropriate solutions. To this end, we conducted a quasi-experimental study (N = 777) in which participants evaluated four decision-making scenarios with controlled tradeoffs. Participants significantly preferred human decision-making (HDM) over ADM in three of four scenarios, emphasizing the value of human judgment, contextual understanding, and the ability to incorporate non-quantifiable factors. Furthermore, in terms of tradeoffs, our findings not only show that participants' preferences are highly context-dependent, but also that their perception of a specific objective, fairness, extends beyond formal definitions. Participants interpret fairness through multiple lenses, including privacy risks and susceptibility to manipulation, and view unfair or manipulated outcomes as failures of accuracy. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of context-aware and human-centered approaches when designing and governing ADM systems in high-stakes situations. Rather than purely technical objectives, it is essential to evaluate ADM systems based on how their tradeoffs align with specific expectations within a given domain, as well as with societal values and perceptions of harm and fairness.

Abstract: Advances in AI-driven automation have raised questions about how humans might find wellbeing in a world where paid employment is less necessary or less available than before. Paid work has been variously characterized as both a contributor and an impediment to human wellbeing. What is already known about the relationship between paid work and wellbeing? What factors influence wellbeing among people who do not work---or who do not need to work? And how might these factors bear upon prospective AI-induced economic transformations? To help provide empirical grounding for these questions, we survey the psychological, sociological, and economic literature that investigates the relationship between wellbeing and work. We draw on evidence from multiple populations, including the unemployed, retirees, lottery winners, and financially dependent spouses. This comparative review draws from studies across OECD countries, China, India, and Gulf states. We identify three key factors that mediate the relationship between work status and wellbeing: (1) agency and choice---whether the exit from work is voluntary or involuntary, as well as long-term agency; (2) the availability of alternative sources of work's latent benefits---such as volunteering, hobbies, or state-provisioned employment; and (3) social and systemic context---including cultural norms around work and the robustness of social safety nets. We draw on these three factors to derive specific implications for different AI automation scenarios, connecting the empirical evidence to concrete policy considerations.

Abstract: Compute governance today is a governance of training: the thresholds, reporting requirements, and frontier-AI regimes now in force attach to training compute and treat the trained model as the regulatory unit. That picture is incomplete: capability increasingly migrates to the deployment stage through inference-time scaling, agentic scaffolding, and compression onto consumer hardware. This paper asks which mechanisms are available once the regulatory object shifts from the training run to the inference call. We develop a feasibility taxonomy of twenty inference-time mechanisms across monitoring, verification, and enforcement, each rated on a four-point readiness scale against a documented four-vendor evidence base. We then stress the taxonomy against a two-dimensional adversary model (three capability tiers crossed with four adversary roles) and map each mechanism to four governance scenarios (domestic regulation, bilateral or multilateral coordination, industry self-regulation, and compute-marketplace governance). Fifteen of the twenty mechanisms have commercial technical substrates in production today, although governance-grade assurance and adversarial robustness vary substantially. The adversary analysis shows that this readiness holds only against a cooperative deployer and a low-to-medium-capability user: no mechanism rates adequate against a high-capability state-level deployer, and fine-tuning removes the model-internal components of the enforcement cluster, although platform-external controls can persist. A substitution analysis connects the taxonomy to a companion hardware paper as a conditional substitution principle describing when inference-stage and hardware-stage mechanisms provide comparable regulatory coverage under stated conditions. A second-rater reliability check on a random subset of the readiness ratings returned a quadratic-weighted Cohen's kappa of 0.74.

Abstract: Algorithmic outputs now populate the digital environments through which contemporary life is organized. The role of law in facilitating and constituting (rather than merely responding to) these processes is gaining increasing traction across scholarly accounts. This inquiry traces the evolution of algorithmic outputs attending to their legal underpinnings and social implications, surfacing the mutations of machine speech. The first mutation redefined speech as data to be queried: search engines transformed the web from a space of information retrieval into an economic regime of algorithmic visibility. The second mutation reframed speech as engagement: social media platforms fused moderation with amplification, turning expression into a metric of attention, governed by corporate architectures. The third mutation emerges in conversational systems and interfaces, where generative text displaces information retrieval, bringing with it dense technolegal entanglements and profound epistemic consequences. Scholars of freedom of expression, informational privacy, and communication studies have long grappled with these dynamics, yet their implications for broader legal thought have also become urgent. This piece seeks to organize and clarify the evolving debate around algorithmic speech, making this critical but often fragmented discourse more accessible to wider legal and interdisciplinary audiences. In doing so, it bridges the gap between observing technological transformation and critically assessing the constitutive role of law within it, offering a conceptual resource for researchers, students, policymakers, and practitioners navigating and contesting this evolving landscape.