multiagent system designers

Abstract: Can simple no-regret dynamics attain smaller regret in self-play than against arbitrary adversaries? In $n$-player general-sum games, Daskalakis et al. 2021 proved an $O(n\log d_i\log^4 T)$ individual regret bound for Optimistic Hedge, which improves upon the classical $O(\sqrt T)$ adversarial regret bound. In this work, we show that Optimistic Hedge with a constant step size can further achieve $O(\sqrt n\log d_i\log T)$ individual external regret under expected loss-vector feedback. The time-averaged play consequently enjoys a coarse correlated equilibrium gap $O(\sqrt n\log d\log T/T)$, where $d=\max_i d_i$. The improvement comes from a larger admissible step size $η=Θ(1/(\sqrt n\log T))$. Our analysis proves factorial bounds on high-order differences of probability-weighted pairwise loss gaps, then applies finite-difference interpolation in a fixed Euclidean norm. These estimates sharpen the analysis of Daskalakis et al. 2021 and yield a logarithmic regret bound.

Abstract: We study risk-sensitive evolutionary learning dynamics and their long-run equilibrium selection behaviors in coordination games. Agents' risk attitudes enter through the classical entropic risk measure, which evaluates opponent-induced payoff uncertainty and feeds into noisy best responses under two standard revision protocols: best response with mutations and logit choice. We first analyze $2\times 2$ coordination games in both single-population symmetric and two-population asymmetric settings. In the single-population setting, unlike the risk-neutral case where the dynamics are known to favor the risk-dominant equilibrium, we show that risk sensitivity can change the stochastically stable outcome: a greater risk-seeking attitude favors the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while a greater risk-averse attitude favors the maximin equilibrium. Thus, the population's risk attitude may act as a control knob for long-run equilibrium selection. In both population settings, we also identify a robust regime: any super-dominant equilibrium is stochastically stable for all risk attitudes, under both protocols, and across populations. We further extend the single-population analysis to symmetric $k$-action games, which include symmetric $k$-action coordination games as a special case, under risk-sensitive best response with mutations. In this setting, we show that, for sufficiently large populations, sufficiently risk-seeking agents uniquely select the strongly payoff-dominant equilibrium when it exists, whereas sufficiently risk-averse agents uniquely select the strongly maximin equilibrium when it exists. These results show that entropic risk sensitivity may serve as a systematic mechanism for steering equilibrium selection in evolutionary games, beyond the classical risk-neutral benchmark.