Risk attitudes influence long-term outcomes in coordination games

Entropic Risk-Sensitive Evolutionary Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games

Computer Science and Game TheoryMultiagent Systems

Summary

Sometimes people or groups have to choose together between different options that benefit them differently. This study looks at how being more or less worried about risk changes which shared choice is made over time. The authors show that when players are more risk-seeking, they tend to pick the option with the highest reward, but when they are more risk-averse, they prefer the safest option. These results suggest that how people feel about risk acts like a control that can steer which outcome becomes stable in repeated decisions.

What this means in practice

  • For game theorists: Incorporate risk-sensitive learning models to predict which equilibria emerge in coordination scenarios more accurately.
  • For multiagent system designers: Design agent behaviors with tunable risk attitudes to control which collective outcomes are favored in coordination tasks.

A theory result. No direct application yet.

Authors

Solaleh Mohammadi, Xiang Gao, Kaiqing Zhang

Abstract

We study risk-sensitive evolutionary learning dynamics and their long-run equilibrium selection behaviors in coordination games. Agents' risk attitudes enter through the classical entropic risk measure, which evaluates opponent-induced payoff uncertainty and feeds into noisy best responses under two standard revision protocols: best response with mutations and logit choice. We first analyze $2\times 2$ coordination games in both single-population symmetric and two-population asymmetric settings. In the single-population setting, unlike the risk-neutral case where the dynamics are known to favor the risk-dominant equilibrium, we show that risk sensitivity can change the stochastically stable outcome: a greater risk-seeking attitude favors the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while a greater risk-averse attitude favors the maximin equilibrium. Thus, the population's risk attitude may act as a control knob for long-run equilibrium selection. In both population settings, we also identify a robust regime: any super-dominant equilibrium is stochastically stable for all risk attitudes, under both protocols, and across populations. We further extend the single-population analysis to symmetric $k$-action games, which include symmetric $k$-action coordination games as a special case, under risk-sensitive best response with mutations. In this setting, we show that, for sufficiently large populations, sufficiently risk-seeking agents uniquely select the strongly payoff-dominant equilibrium when it exists, whereas sufficiently risk-averse agents uniquely select the strongly maximin equilibrium when it exists. These results show that entropic risk sensitivity may serve as a systematic mechanism for steering equilibrium selection in evolutionary games, beyond the classical risk-neutral benchmark.