Ethereum designs migration to post-quantum keys before old keys break
Correctable Enrollment and One-Transaction Seed Proofs for Ethereum's Post-Quantum Transition
Cryptography and Security
Summary
Quantum computers can break Ethereum accounts by discovering private keys, risking a large amount of Ethereum. The authors propose a migration plan that lets users safely enroll new quantum-resistant keys before the old cryptography is disabled. If needed, users can prove ownership through their wallet seed within a deadline to fix mistakes or recover accounts. This design is tested in software and simulations, showing it can handle millions of accounts over weeks without losing funds.
What this means in practice
- •For blockchain node operators: Implement this migration design to securely transition nodes to post-quantum cryptographic keys before ECDSA retirement.
- •For cryptocurrency wallet developers: Develop wallet features enabling users to enroll post-quantum keys or perform seed-based recovery proofs as part of Ethereum's quantum-safe migration.
Authors
Xin Jin, Maximillian Liao, Handong Chen, Yi Nancy Li, Junyu Liu
Abstract
A quantum computer running Shor's algorithm can extract the private key of every Ethereum account whose public key is published, and accounts exposed by their own transactions hold 54.6% of execution-layer ETH. As the first such machine may stay secret, a migration cannot wait for visible thefts, and once keys are extractable, legacy signatures no longer tell owners from attackers. We design a migration in which owners enroll post-quantum keys cheaply with their existing signatures before ECDSA is retired at a scheduled time, while a zero-knowledge proof of the wallet's BIP-39 seed can correct any such enrollment until a common deadline afterward; an account nobody enrolled stays frozen and recoverable by seed proof without a deadline. Each proof binds the new key, a nonce and a fee cap, so neither a paying sponsor nor a reordering block builder can redirect or replay it. Validators switch to hash-based keys first, at a finalized checkpoint and under a stated bound on the attacker's voting power. We prove the account guarantees under explicit assumptions, model-check the rules, and implement the design in go-ethereum and a Lean consensus client. A three-layer recursive hash-based STARK yields a seed proof of about 190 KB that fits one transaction, verifies in 38 ms and takes a median of 111 s to generate on a laptop; four proofs aggregate into one. In a ten-node simulation with mainnet-derived accounts and fee demand, block space rather than proving sets the duration: the 4.45 million accounts with at least 0.1 ETH would migrate in 29.4 days if all enroll before ECDSA is retired and in 235 days if all recover after it in batches of four. In a mass enrollment, an enrollment waits a median of 19.1 minutes in the public mempool, longer than published estimates for a fast quantum computer to extract its key, so owners with a seed and an unexposed key should migrate by seed proof.