Misbinding risk affects tool provider identity in AI agent systems

When Tool Names Are Not Identities: Measuring Provider Misbinding in MCP-Based AI Agents

Cryptography and SecurityArtificial Intelligence

Summary

AI agents use tools from different sources, but they might mix up which tool comes from whom because the tool names and descriptions can be misleading. The authors show that attackers can trick AI agents into using fake tools without breaking into the system itself. This confusion happens especially when the fake tool’s name, description, and format look just right to the AI. Different AI clients handle this problem in unique ways, sometimes asking for clarification or making inconsistent choices.

What this means in practice

  • For software developers: Detect and prevent tool-provider misbinding in AI systems that use multiple external tools via Model Context Protocol.
  • For cybersecurity teams: Improve security by monitoring and mitigating risks from attacker-run MCP servers that mimic legitimate tool metadata.

Authors

Zeynab Anbiaee, Sajjad Dadkhah, Ali A. Ghorbani

Abstract

Large language model (LLM) applications increasingly act as agents that select and invoke external tools. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes this interaction by allowing clients to compose tools advertised by multiple servers. However, tool metadata used for discovery and selection is not, by itself, necessarily bound to a verified provider identity. This paper studies this gap as tool-provider misbinding: a failure in which a request intended for a legitimate provider is instead resolved to an attacker-controlled tool. The attacker does not compromise the host, LLM, legitimate server, or network channel; it only operates another MCP server that advertises tools with chosen metadata. We formulate tool provider misbinding as an attacker-controlled tool-selection optimization problem and evaluate it in a controlled MCP environment across five LLM-based clients. The results show that interactions drive misbinding. The strongest failures occur when exact-name collision, task-aligned description, and compatible schema reinforce one another, but authority-enhanced descriptions with compatible schema can also cause wrong-provider execution or unresolved provider ambiguity without name collision. Different models expose the same provider-binding weakness differently, including attacker-controlled provider selection, clarification requests, and unstable or inconsistent provider resolution.