Refusal removal does not get uniformly harder in newer large language models
Is Abliteration Getting Harder? Not Uniformly: Refusal Removal by Direction-Based Ablation and ARA in Heretic on the Qwen3.8, Gemma 4, Olmo 3.1 and Mistral Small 3.2 LLMs Versus Their Predecessors
Artificial IntelligenceComputation and Language
Summary
Large language models (LLMs) sometimes refuse to follow certain prompts for safety. A way to fix this without retraining, called abliteration, edits the model's weights to remove these refusals. The authors found that newer LLM versions are not always harder to fix this way—sometimes removal works better, sometimes worse, depending on the model, method, and prompt set. They also found variability depending on how the removal is tested, suggesting no simple pattern of increased resistance to refusal removal in newer models.
What this means in practice
- •For llm developers: Improve strategies for removing refusal responses in new LLM versions by selecting appropriate weight editing methods and budgets.
- •For ai safety teams: Evaluate and adapt refusal removal techniques to maintain safe LLM behavior across model updates with variable effectiveness.
Authors
Richard J. Young
Abstract
Abliteration, a fine-tuning-free weight edit, removes refusal from open-weight large language models (LLMs). The developer of Arbitrary-Rank Ablation (ARA), an optimisation-based variant, reports that direction-based abliteration, which ablates a refusal direction, increasingly fails on newer models. On five release pairs, refusal removal did not become uniformly harder. Qwen2.5-32B and Qwen3.8-27B, Gemma-2-27B and Gemma-4-31B, OLMo-2-32B and Olmo-3.1-32B, Mistral-Small-2409 and Mistral-Small-3.2, and Qwen2.5-7B and Qwen3.5-4B were edited in Heretic 2.0 by three or four direction-based methods (difference-in-means, MPOA, SOM and, on the small pair, J-space) and ARA under the same prompts, nominal search budget, first-token KL divergence cap and selection rule; removal counted as harder when the automatic WildGuard judge found more of 972 held-out harmful prompts (JailbreakBench, XSTest, StrongREJECT, HarmBench and an author-compiled malicious-code bank) still refused. After direction-based removal, newer releases retained -1 to +37 percentage points more refusal, and after ARA -26 to +34. With run-to-run variance included, between-pair heterogeneity of the direction-based effect ranged from high to low with the scale and variance model (I^2 20-80%). ARA lost less effectiveness than direction-based methods in Gemma and OLMo and more in Qwen; each verdict rests on one ARA run, and some changed with the divergence budget or variance model. In Gemma the direction-based increase came from the malicious-code bank and reversed on public sets. Contrary to prediction, keyword counts at the tool's window did not undercount judged refusal on average, but differed by a mean 7 points per model. Audits of a single pair, method or prompt source can reach opposite conclusions. Whether a newer model resisted removal depended on the release pair, method and budget, not on generation alone.