LLM defenders lure attacks into isolated honeypots to protect real targets
A Gingerbread House for LLM Agents: Source-Planned Honeypots That Lure Autonomous Attackers into an Isolated Shadow
Cryptography and Security
Summary
Large language model (LLM) agents can find and exploit web security weaknesses very quickly, sometimes before fixes are made. To stop real damage, the authors tested a trick where a fake vulnerable system called a honeypot is created from the app’s actual source code, and attackers are redirected there once identified. This way, hackers' attacks still succeed—but only on the fake copy, leaving the real site safe. Tests showed this method greatly reduced successful attacks on real systems, though hackers might reach the real site before being caught.
What this means in practice
- •For web security teams: Deploy honeypots automatically planned from source code to isolate and trap automated LLM-driven attacks, reducing real system compromises.
- •For cloud infrastructure managers: Use request routing rules to divert confirmed attacker traffic to isolated shadow environments, protecting production web applications.
Authors
Seungdeok Roh, Seokjun Ryu, Sohee Park, Daeseon Choi
Abstract
LLM agents can exploit web vulnerabilities fast enough that patching may come too late. Deception against such agents has mostly lured them away from a real target that stays reachable. We study a different arrangement: an LLM defender plans a static honeypot from the application's source, and a router sends every later request of a client it confirms as an attacker, including a working exploit, to an isolated shadow copy. We compare no defence, this static plan, and an augmented configuration with a runtime LLM responder and further router rules, graded by the benchmark's own grader on the real target and, for ARTEX, also on the shadow. On the 40 critical CVE-Bench tasks the static plan cut real compromise from 26/40 to 5/40 for Claude Opus 4.8 and from 20/40 to 0/40 (31 valid runs) for the ARTEX attack framework. On 20 new tasks not used in the design, ARTEX went from 15/20 to 0/20. In about half of the deception-arm runs ARTEX's exploit succeeded on the shadow while the real target stayed intact: the defence moved a working exploit rather than stopping it, and the remaining risk lies in requests that reach the real target before confirmation. ARTEX reported a planted fake secret as genuine on 30 of the 120 deception-arm tasks, five times in a report that labelled another item a decoy. With ARTEX's real compromise at zero in both deception configurations, they did not differ significantly on the remaining outcomes, a comparison that does not isolate the responder.