Randomness and money burning can boost benefits in trade but with limits

The Power and Limits of Money Burning in Bilateral Trade

Computer Science and Game Theory

Summary

The paper looks at how two people trading a single item can sometimes do better if some of the money paid is deliberately wasted (burned). Normally, wasting money in trade only hurts everyone involved, but the authors show that if the trading rules allow random choices, wasting money can actually help both buyer and seller gain more. However, even with this trick, they prove there are limits to how much better off the traders can be, and they can't always get a big share of the best possible outcome.

What this means in practice

  • For market designers: Design trading rules for auctions and exchanges that use randomization and money burning to enhance trader benefits in specific settings.
  • For online payment systems: Implement transaction mechanisms that incorporate randomized fees to potentially improve trade outcomes for users involving indivisible goods.

A theory result. No direct application yet.

Authors

Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan, Ariel Shaulker

Abstract

We study the power of money burning in bilateral trade. In this problem, a seller owns an indivisible item, a buyer would like to acquire it, and each of these two traders has a private value for the item and the values are sampled from independent distributions. We ask whether the traders can benefit from a mechanism that burns money, that is, one that charges the buyer more than it pays the seller, so that neither trader enjoys the difference (money burnt is a loss for the traders). Is it possible that the traders will ever be better off if the trade mechanism can burn money? For Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms and for deterministic dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) mechanisms, it is known that money burning is always a waste and can only hurt the traders. Maybe surprisingly, we show that once a DSIC mechanism can use randomization, money burning can significantly benefit the traders, and the gain of each of them can be arbitrarily large. In contrast, we show that the power of DSIC randomized mechanisms that burn money is still very limited in the sense that they cannot guarantee any constant fraction of the first-best gains-from-trade.