Learning algorithms shape game outcomes and enable collusion
How Learning Selects Equilibria and When It Leads to Collusion
Summary
This paper looks at how the design of learning algorithms affects which solutions players settle on in repeated games where they make decisions over time. The authors find that certain learning behaviors tend to select outcomes that benefit all players, sometimes leading to collusion where companies earn more than usual competitive profits. For example, in repeated market competition models, the learning process can push firms toward agreements that resemble monopoly profits rather than standard competition. These findings highlight how algorithmic learning can influence economic outcomes and explain why collusion might emerge without explicit agreements.
What this means in practice
- •For market designers: Recognize how learning dynamics among competing firms can lead to unintentional collusion beyond classical equilibria, informing regulation and market monitoring.
- •For multiagent system developers: Design learning algorithms for agents that influence which equilibria arise in repeated strategic interactions, tailoring cooperation or competition outcomes.
A theory result. No direct application yet.