Fairly dividing uncertain goods improves post-allocation satisfaction

Fair Division of Lotteries

Computer Science and Game Theory

Summary

The paper looks at how to share items whose values are not known until after they are divided. It studies fairness from two angles: before the values are known (ex-ante) and after they are revealed (ex-post). The authors find conditions where making a fair division beforehand also makes it likely to be considered fair after values are known. They also explore how difficult it is to measure fairness after values become clear and offer some algorithms for it.

What this means in practice

A theory result. No direct application yet.

Authors

Ayumi Igarashi, Yeeseok Oh

Abstract

We study fair division of uncertain items, where the utility of each item is a random variable whose realization is observed only after the allocation is determined. This uncertainty creates a distinction between ex-ante fairness, evaluated before utilities are realized, and ex-post fairness, evaluated after realization. We examine to what extent these two notions are compatible. We first identify conditions under which ex-ante envy-free allocations maximize ex-post envy-freeness probability. These include two-agent instances where utilities toward the same item follow the same distribution from a convolution-power family. For an arbitrary number of agents, we establish analogous optimality results when the common generator is non-atomic or log-concave. Beyond convolution-power families, we derive approximation guarantees for ex-ante envy-free allocations relative to the optimal ex-post envy-freeness probability under log-concave or symmetric utilities. We also study the computational complexity of evaluating ex-post envy-freeness probabilities, establishing hardness results as well as pseudo-polynomial-time algorithms.