Security risks found in 6G and O-RAN networks with open interfaces

Security evaluation of 6G-oriented and O-RAN networks through targeted attacks

Cryptography and SecurityNetworking and Internet Architecture

Summary

As new 6G networks adopt technologies that automate operations, they also open more doors for hackers to cause trouble. The authors designed and tested an attack that takes advantage of a weak link in the network, allowing a bad actor to interrupt connections and spy on data. They used a virtual setup combining several open-source projects and an electric vehicle charging system to show how this attack works. This helps understand potential dangers and how to better protect future networks.

What this means in practice

Authors

Apostolos Valiakos, Dimitrios Psaltis, Alexios Lekidis, Nikolaos Kekatos, Elpiniki Papageorgiou

Abstract

The sixth generation (6G) of networks is supported by increased bandwidth, automation through the use of O-RAN technologies. Simultaneously though autonomous operation leads to an extensive threat surface and sophisticated attacks. Understanding the attack impact, the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures that are used by attackers is extremely challenging, but however is crucial for developing defense and mitigation strategies against them. This paper evaluates a targeted attack chain against a virtualized, 6G-oriented O-RAN testbed in which the F1 midhaul interface is accessible to an attacker and transport-layer protection is not enabled. The attack disrupts the legitimate O-DU association, introduces a rogue O-DU using observed configuration parameters, and intercepts user-plane traffic. The attack was evaluated in a fully virtualized testbed based on Open5GS, the srsRAN Project, FlexRIC, and an Electric Vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure based on OCPP 1.6.