Blockchain clients become active to ensure transaction inclusion safety

How Not to Be Censored: Inclusion Safety in Client-Led Consensus

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing

Summary

Most blockchain systems give validators control over which transactions get recorded, leaving users uncertain if their transactions will be included quickly. The authors study a new system where users actively help decide which transactions are accepted, improving the chances their transactions will be included in the blockchain securely. They define a guarantee called inclusion safety, meaning if a transaction is excluded from some blocks, those blocks will eventually be discarded. Their approach allows transactions to be safely included either through direct contact with honest nodes or by relaying the transaction over time across blockchain versions. This work provides a way for users to better ensure their transactions are not censored, even in complex network conditions.

What this means in practice

  • For blockchain engineers: Design blockchain protocols where users actively participate to guarantee their transactions get included despite partial network failures or censorship threats.
  • For distributed system architects: Build distributed ledgers that leverage client connectivity and honest replica cooperation to ensure reliable inclusion of user data under mixed network conditions.

A theory result. No direct application yet.

Authors

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Andrea Canidio

Abstract

Blockchain consensus protocols implicitly follow a client-server architecture: validators are the only active participants, while clients (i.e., users) merely submit transactions and rely on validators to include them. This abstraction obscures a fundamental question: what should a client do to guarantee the timely inclusion of its own transaction? We study this question by introducing a leaderless consensus protocol in which clients are active. We define inclusion safety: the guarantee that a client's transaction enters some of the blocks produced for an epoch, and that every block omitting it belongs to a fork that is eventually abandoned. Because every transaction carries a reference to a block of the previous epoch, clients help select the surviving fork. This yields two paths to inclusion: reaching sufficiently many honest replicas within an epoch, or relaying a block containing the transaction across epochs until the corresponding fork becomes canonical. In a generalized model spanning synchrony and asynchrony, the client's and the replicas' connectivity are substitutes for inclusion safety: it is achieved either if the client is well connected, or if the client is poorly connected but honest replicas communicate reliably, provided the client reaches at least one of them. However, the substitution is imperfect: when inclusion safety rests on the replicas' connectivity, it requires a longer epoch compared to when the client is well connected.