Telecom network security improved with multi-stage attack analysis framework

MASAR: Multi-stage Attack Surface Analysis and Reasoning Framework for Telecom Networks

Cryptography and SecurityNetworking and Internet Architecture

Summary

Modern telecom networks are complex and face many security risks that are hard to understand fully. The authors created a new system called MASAR that links theoretical security weaknesses with real-world network actions and attack steps. MASAR uses diagrams and formal models to break down how attacks happen and tests these ideas on 5G network components. This approach helps security teams better predict and block attacks based on detailed telecom protocols and network states.

What this means in practice

  • For telecom security engineers: Assess 5G network weaknesses by mapping architectural threats directly to signaling protocol exploits and attack sequences.
  • For network protocol developers: Use MASAR’s formal reasoning tools to analyze unsafe protocol states and design more secure telecom signaling interfaces.

Authors

Heba Osama, Wessam DeifAllah, Ahmed Saafan, Haitham Ghalwash

Abstract

The increasing complexity of modern telecommunications networks introduces security challenges that require systematic threat analysis. However, a gap remains between architectural threat modeling frameworks, such as Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege (STRIDE), and operational knowledge bases, such as the MITRE Five-G Hierarchy of Threats (FiGHT). This gap limits the ability to connect architectural weaknesses with specific protocol behaviors and attack sequences. This paper presents Multi-stage Attack Surface Analysis and Reasoning (MASAR), a formal framework that bridges this gap through three layers: strategic threat mapping, logical attack path decomposition using directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), and operational synthesis of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). MASAR is evaluated using a 5G-ready IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) architecture, examining two signaling attack scenarios: early media billing bypass through Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) signaling and subscriber information disclosure and topology discovery through the Diameter Cx interface. MiniZinc constraint models are used to analyze the reachability of unsafe protocol states. The analysis demonstrates how MASAR connects architectural threats with specific protocol behaviors and supports security controls that account for network states in telecommunications systems.