Batch normalization watermarks vulnerable to data free attacks

On the Vulnerabilities and Data-Free Removal of Watermarks in Batch Normalization Layers

Cryptography and Security

Summary

Watermarks in AI models help prove who made them, especially in shared learning projects. The authors found that a common way to hide these watermarks inside certain layers called batch normalization can be easily removed without needing any training data. Their method breaks these watermarks while keeping the model working well. This shows the usual security tricks relying on hiding methods might not be enough.

What this means in practice

Authors

Elena Rodríguez-Lois, Fernando Pérez-González

Abstract

Batch Normalization (BN) layers have become a common choice for embedding white-box watermarks in Federated Learning (FL), providing a simple and effective mechanism for model ownership verification and participant identification. However, previous works have focused on robustness against generic model modifications, leaving the security implications of this design largely unexplored. In this paper, we identify fundamental vulnerabilities of BN-based watermarking schemes and propose a practical data-free attack that exploits them. Experimental results on two representative FL watermarking schemes show that the proposed attack consistently removes the watermark with minimal impact on model performance, even without access to representative training data. More broadly, our findings highlight the importance of evaluating DNN watermarking schemes under threat models consistent with Kerckhoffs's principle, rather than relying on security through obscurity.