Post quantum cryptography runs efficiently on small devices in tls connections

Testing TLS 1.3 PQC on constrained devices and microcontrollers

Cryptography and Security

Summary

As governments plan to upgrade to quantum-safe cryptography by the mid-2030s, this paper examines how these new methods work on small internet-connected devices like microcontrollers. The authors tested different combinations of quantum-resistant and traditional cryptography in secure internet connection setups (TLS 1.3) using small hardware like the Raspberry Pi Pico and ESP32. Surprisingly, some quantum-safe methods were actually faster and used less energy than traditional cryptography on these limited devices. This finding suggests that full quantum-safe security is practical even on very constrained hardware, though some variations in signing speed need consideration for time-sensitive uses.

What this means in practice

  • For iot device developers: Choose quantum-safe cryptography combinations for efficient and energy-saving secure connections on constrained devices like Raspberry Pi Pico and ESP32.
  • For embedded system engineers: Optimize TLS 1.3 implementations by selecting full post-quantum cryptography methods that can outperform traditional schemes on hardware without specialized assembly support.

Authors

Olivier Gillot, William J. Buchanan, Callum Turino

Abstract

The UK, EU and US governments have set timelines for post-quantum cryptography migration of critical systems, with deadlines ranging from 2028 to 2035. This paper focuses on IoT-class devices and microcontrollers and the viability of using PQC to connect these devices in secure TLS 1.3 connections. Using wolfSSL, we benchmark a 36-combination TLS 1.3 algorithm matrix, pairing ML-KEM-512/768/1024 and X25519/ECC P-256 key exchange with ML-DSA-44/65/87, Ed25519, ECDSA, and RSA-PSS authentication, across four devices (Raspberry Pi Pico W & Pico 2 W, ESP32, and a Raspberry Pi Zero), measuring both handshake latency and energy consumption. We found that in capable devices, all choices in the TLS matrix gave similar results, but that in IoT-class devices, PQC performance is highly implementation- and architecture-dependent: the common assumption that elliptic-curve key exchange must be cheaper than post-quantum lattice-based key exchange does not hold in this wolfSSL-based implementation, where the best full-PQC combination (ML-KEM-512 + ML-DSA-44) completes TLS handshakes 41% faster than the equivalent classical-modern pairing (X25519 + RSA-PSS) on the Pico W (up to 2.12x as energy-efficient, depending on the paired authentication algorithm), and 8.9x faster on the ESP32. Full-PQC, ML-KEM-512/ML-DSA-44, is not only possible but energy-competitive with or superior to Hybrid or Elliptic Curve alternatives on the most constrained devices, though ML-DSA's variable signing time means applications with strict latency-predictability budgets must accept this variance as the cost of full quantum-safe authentication. We further show that the IETF's draft-specified X25519+ML-KEM-768 hybrid incurs approximately the combined cost of its two components, rather than offering a performance compromise, making pure ML-KEM the more practical choice on hardware lacking Curve25519 assembly support.