Model obfuscation protects edge AI devices against cross-node attacks

Mind Your Boundaries: Boundary-Aware Model Obfuscation against Cross-node Attack

Cryptography and SecurityArtificial Intelligence

Summary

When devices like phones or smart gadgets learn on their own, hackers can sometimes steal the secrets of the AI inside by getting control of one device. The authors found a way to make AI models harder to copy and attack by tweaking how their decision boundaries curve, without hurting their accuracy. They split the model’s parameters into parts controlling position and curvature of the decision rules and add noise to the curvature part. This makes it much harder for attackers to use one stolen model to break into others.

What this means in practice

  • For edge device engineers: Implement enhanced model protection to reduce risk of widespread compromise from one hacked edge device.
  • For mobile app developers: Apply parameter obfuscation techniques to safeguard models embedded in apps against reverse-engineering attacks.

Authors

Yuyang Zhang, Yihui Jin, Kangjie Chen, Leyang Wu, Run Wang

Abstract

With the advancement of powerful AI chips, on-device machine learning is gaining traction for its low latency and privacy protection. However, when edge devices are compromised, attackers can obtain white-box access to the deployed models by reversing the apps directly to obtain the knowledge of peer devices, which is known as Cross-Node Attacks, like performing efficient adversarial attacks. Most existing defenses target known vulnerabilities, yet white-box access still enables attackers to uncover more unknown weaknesses. This creates a critical risk for edge-device deployments, where one compromised device can endanger all models distributed from the same source. Motivated by findings that the model robustness is primarily influenced by the curvature of the decision boundary, we investigate how model parameters shape its curvature. In this paper, we propose a novel method, BMO, that obfuscates model parameters to diversify the decision boundary further resisting cross-node attack while preserving its benign accuracy. Specifically, we explore decomposing model parameters into boundary-position and boundary-curvature components based on null-space constraints, then models with differentiated decision boundaries are instantiated by injecting noise into the boundary-curvature component. Across all four major types of adversarial attacks with four widely-deployed on-device models, BMO achieves an average success rate of 68.68% in defense, far exceeding the most competitive baseline, which attains only 22.32% in defending against cross-node attacks. Moreover, BMO achieves comparable performance in benign accuracy compared with baselines.