Delegation challenges in group governance balance cost and control
The Delegation Dilemma: Economies of Scale, Accountability, and Polycentric Governance
Multiagent SystemsArtificial IntelligenceMachine Learning
Summary
Groups often share decision-making by choosing representatives to reduce costs, but this can cause leaders to act in their own interest rather than the group's. The paper studies how bigger groups benefit from shared costs but make it harder to keep leaders accountable. It shows that groups need to be just the right size to avoid leaders exploiting members and that multiple centers of power often emerge. Simulations with AI agents confirmed these patterns, showing cycles where leadership shifts between cooperation and exploitation.
What this means in practice
- •For organizational designers: Design governance structures balancing cost-sharing with leader accountability by limiting group sizes and enabling multiple leadership centers to reduce exploitation.
- •For distributed system architects: Model delegation and control trade-offs in distributed decision-making systems to improve reliability and reduce single points of failure.
Tested on simulated data.
Authors
Arin Mukhopadhyay, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Panayiotis Danassis
Abstract
Many collective-action systems are neither fully decentralized nor fully centralized: agents voluntarily organize into institutions that share organizational costs and delegate decisions to representatives. Delegation can reduce individual costs, but it also transfers control to representatives whose private objectives need not align with those of their constituents. We study this tension in a repeated game with endogenous delegation to self-interested centers. A simple reduced-form model yields a scale--accountability tradeoff: larger constituencies offer greater cost-sharing benefits to members, yet the marginal value to a center of retaining any one constituent decreases as group size grows. Consequently, the prospect of individual exit can sustain non-exploitative delegation only up to an endogenous accountable constituency size. Additionally, we identify parameter regions in which fully delegated, accountable governance, when feasible, must be polycentric. We investigate these predictions through simulations with large language model (LLM) agents. Across five matched pairs of 30-agent simulations, polycentric structures repeatedly emerge but remain fluid, exhibiting cycles of concentration, exploitation, exit, and re-formation. We further find that models of different capacity exhibit similar willingness to assume leadership but differ substantially in their exercise of authority, with Sol initiating exploitation more frequently than Luna in matched decision states.