Auction designs measured by worst case environment performance
Robustness in Mechanism Design
Computer Science and Game Theory
Summary
This paper looks at how to design auctions that perform well no matter what the conditions are. The authors focus on measuring the worst-case performance of auctions compared to the best possible auction for any environment. They explore different types of auctions and objectives like how well resources are used, how much money is made, and how gains from trade are maximized. The paper also shows that some design shortcuts, like using revelation mechanisms, can reduce auction robustness, and they introduce a way to measure this loss.
What this means in practice
- •For online marketplace engineers: Design auctions that guarantee good performance across diverse market scenarios without prior knowledge of participant valuations.
- •For financial exchange platform designers: Develop exchange mechanisms that robustly maximize trade benefits despite uncertain trading environments and participant strategies.
A survey. It maps existing work.
Authors
Jason Hartline
Abstract
The article reviews the robust design and analysis of auctions, focusing on the predominant paradigm in the computer science literature, which quantifies robustness by the worst-case, over environments, ratio between the robust auction's performance and that of an optimal auction for the environment. Applications include robust analysis of canonical auctions such as the first-price auction for the welfare objective, prior-robust auction design for the revenue objective, and prior-robust design of exchange mechanisms for the gains-from-trade objective. Finally, the revelation principle is not without loss in robust mechanism design. The potential loss can be quantified by the revelation gap, the fraction of the optimal robust guarantee that is lost when restricting from all mechanisms to revelation mechanisms.