Electromagnetic signals reveal hardware trojans tampering with kernel memory
Assessing Runtime Electromagnetic Detection of CPU Hardware Trojans Targeting Kernel Memory
Cryptography and Security
Summary
Hardware trojans are secret, malicious changes to computer chips that can cause harm. The authors studied if tiny electromagnetic signals given off by a computer’s processor could help detect such hidden changes while the computer runs. They tested this on a processor running Linux and found that these signals could indirectly show when a trojan caused unusual software actions. This method doesn’t require damaging the chip and can act in real time, making it a promising way to catch hardware problems.
What this means in practice
- •For embedded system developers: Monitor processors during operation to detect hardware trojans causing memory tampering through unexpected electromagnetic signals.
- •For security operation teams: Add electromagnetic side-channel monitoring to existing security tools to identify suspicious kernel-level behavior caused by hardware trojans.
Authors
Athanasios Moschos, Baki Berkay Yilmaz, Kevin Valakuzhy, Angelos D. Keromytis
Abstract
Side-channels are a promising approach for hardware trojan detection, as they can passively reveal malicious hardware activity without requiring additional circuitry or destructive analysis of the device under test. This work investigates the use of electromagnetic (EM) emanations for runtime detection of hardware trojan attacks. Using an open-source hardware trojan that implements an arbitrary memory-write primitive, we tamper with the kernel memory of a Linux system running on a RISC-V microarchitecture and perform a real-time baseline detection using the processor's EM emissions. Our results indicate that, under certain conditions, hardware trojans can be detected indirectly through the anomalous software behavior they enable.