Information changes troop defection choices in two battlefields
Information Structure of Defection Decisions in a Colonel Blotto Model of Deterrence
Computer Science and Game Theory
Summary
This paper looks at how soldiers decide to obey or disobey orders when there are two battle areas and both sides try to stop each other from acting. The authors show that what the soldiers know about the fight can change the entire game and the chances of outcomes winning or losing. They find that how many troops each side has and the chance to capture important points helps the generals decide what information their soldiers should see before choosing to follow or defect. Different ways of sharing information lead to very different results in who wins and how effective their strategies are.
What this means in practice
- •For military strategists: Determine optimal information sharing policies to influence troop loyalty and improve deterrence effectiveness in multi-battle settings.
- •For security analysts: Analyze scenarios where partial information impacts decision making in conflict zones to better predict defecting behavior.
A theory result. No direct application yet.
Authors
Tristan Mott, David Grimsman, Keith Paarporn
Abstract
In strategic interactions, deterrence is an outcome where one party incentivizes the other party to not participate. This concept can be applied to Colonel Blotto games between two generals where troops can be deterred from following orders by the actions of the opposing general. In this setting, deterrence depends not only on how generals allocate troops, but also on the information available to troops when they decide whether to follow orders or defect. In this work, we study a two-battlefield Colonel Blotto model of deterrence under multiple information structures, ranging from decisions made with only aggregate information to decisions made after local battlefield conditions are observed. We show how different information structures alter the structure of the induced game, affect the existence of equilibria, and substantially change expected utilities. Our findings also prove that the ratio of troops available to each general combined with a capture probability threshold is enough to inform generals about what information they want their troops to have access to.