Container communication protected from MitM attacks with zero trust
Exploiting and Securing Docker containers and Kubernetes pods from a MitM attack
Cryptography and Security
Summary
Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks try to intercept or change communications between computers, which can be risky for programs running in containers like Docker or Kubernetes pods. The authors looked at many studies and then designed a system to stop these attacks by using special security building blocks and firewalls that watch communication closely. Their approach uses a concept called zero trust, meaning everything communicating is constantly checked and nothing is automatically trusted. This work helps those running container systems better protect them from eavesdropping or tampering attacks.
What this means in practice
- •For cloud infrastructure teams: Secure Docker and Kubernetes deployments from MitM attacks by applying the authors' zero trust container communication framework.
- •For network security engineers: Implement layer 7 container firewalls using the proposed approach to monitor and block unauthorized interception within container networks.
Authors
Henry Kabuye, Ismail Khalid Kazmi, Chunyan Mu, Paolo Modesti
Abstract
PURPOSE - Workloads in containers, such as Docker containers and Kubernetes pods, are vulnerable to many of the same attacks as workloads in non-container environments, including phishing, application exploits and network intrusions. This systematic review and design-and-creation study explores techniques for securing containerised-based operating systems against Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. The proposed framework uses a conceptual model for representing communication and cryptographic primitives, together with the AnBxJ Java security library and container firewalls operating at layer 7 of the OSI model. The study addresses the question: How can containerised-based operating systems be effectively secured from Man-in-the-Middle attacks? It aims to support practitioners in protecting Docker and Kubernetes deployments by systematising security practices and applying a zero trust architecture. METHODOLOGY - The research uses a Systematic Review (SR) based on the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA), bringing together evidence from studies addressing the same research topic. FINDINGS - Success factors were identified, and a security mechanism was successfully implemented in a containerised-based operating system scenario. VALUE - The findings may help practitioners protect Kubernetes and Docker installations by systematising container security practices and providing a zero trust architecture for containerised-based operating systems.