Axon improves ROS 2 robot communication with shared memory and quantum keys
AXON: A ROS 2 RMW with Shared-Memory/QUIC Transport and QKD/ML-KEM Key Establishment
Robotics
Summary
ROS 2 is software used to help robots talk to each other and to computers. The authors created AXON, a new way for ROS 2 to send messages more efficiently by using shared memory when on the same machine and a fast internet protocol for remote communication. They also added a special security method that uses quantum key distribution to protect messages from being hacked. This setup helps keep robot communications fast and secure, especially over networks.
What this means in practice
- •For robotics engineers: Build robot systems that communicate efficiently on the same device and securely over networks using AXON’s shared memory and quantum key-based encryption.
- •For network security teams: Secure remote robot communications by integrating quantum-safe key establishment methods alongside fast QUIC transport.
Authors
Sergio Sánchez de la Fuente, Miguel Ángel González-Santamarta, Francisco Javier Rodríguez-Lera, Vicente Matellán Olivera, Ángel Manuel Guerrero-Higueras
Abstract
Robot Operating System 2 (ROS 2) standardizes application code against a middleware interface (RMW) whose reference implementations are built on the Data Distribution Service (DDS). We present AXON, an alternative ROS 2 RMW implementation that separates transport policy by deployment scope. A Rust core and C++ adapter use POSIX shared-memory rings for same-host communication, QUIC for remote communication, and a daemon for discovery and graph synchronization. We then describe two fail-closed TLS 1.3 key-establishment configurations for remote traffic. The classic configuration offers only the hybrid X25519MLKEM768 group, preventing negotiation of a classical-only group. The qkd configuration imports a 256-bit key obtained through the ETSI GS QKD 014 API as a pairwise external PSK and offers no Diffie-Hellman group. Its default messages10 strategy additionally protects remote application messages with AES-256-GCM, rotating KME material after ten outgoing messages and using a fresh nonce per envelope; session relies on QUIC protection alone. The external-PSK path requires a narrow extension to rustls, now bundled with AXON. We define the threat model, distinguish peer authentication in the two configurations, and delimit the implementation-level validation from ROS 2 conformance, comparative performance, and physical-QKD validation.