Revisiting Continuous Noise Sampling for Multi-Party Differential Privacy

Cryptography and Security

Summary

The authors studied how multiple parties can add noise to data securely and privately, but found a weakness in common methods that let attackers guess the original data easily. They showed this problem in two real-world systems and explained why fixing it directly is either too slow or less accurate. To solve this, they designed a new, faster way to generate noise bit-by-bit securely and proved it works well without sacrificing privacy or speed. Their method is much faster than older noisy data methods while keeping data protection strong.

Authors

Yucheng Fu, Tianhao Wang

Abstract

Combining secure multi-party computation (MPC) with differential privacy (DP) enables multiple parties to release aggregate statistics without a trusted curator, and the core primitive is the protocol to sample noise from a continuous distribution under finite-precision arithmetic. In this paper, we revisit the continuous noise sampling protocols and present several improvements in both security and efficiency. We start by identifying a vulnerability in widely used sample-and-scale constructions. We demonstrate that the scaling operation in arithmetic circuits confines the noise to a sparse, publicly known set of values, so that an adversary can observe the released noisy queries and decide which dataset produced them. As concrete demonstrations, we instantiate attacks on two systems employing such ``flawed'' sampling protocols: Orchard (OSDI'20) for DP secure aggregation and DP-BREM$^+$ (USENIX Sec'25) for DP federated learning. We report a near-$100\%$ attack success rate on both systems, under any noise scaler $s\geq 2$ used in practice. The leakage we reveal is intrinsic to the scaling operation, and direct repairs either substantially sacrifice utility or add significant precision bits to make the sampling more expensive. To address the security and efficiency issues together, we turn to discrete sampling at the granularity of individual biased bits. We make several optimizations to the sampler and prove its security. Our implementation achieves $4\times \sim 612\times$ speedup over existing secure discrete samplers and orders-of-magnitude speedup over the insecure sample-and-scale paradigm, with negligible utility loss compared to the ideal continuous mechanism.