Multivalued Consensus: General Adversaries Require More Communication
2026-08-18 • Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster ComputingCryptography and SecurityInformation Theory
AI summaryⓘ
The authors study how hard it is for many parties to agree on something when some might be faulty, using complex adversary models based on projective geometry. They show that under these conditions, agreeing reliably requires a lot of communication, with precise lower bounds depending on the number of parties and output size. Interestingly, they find that if parties do not have to stop sending messages after deciding, the communication cost can be much lower. They also provide new protocols and prove that their lower bounds for asynchronous settings are tight, improving understanding of fault-tolerant consensus costs.
fault-tolerant consensusByzantine agreementasynchronous networksadversary structuresprojective geometryquorumreliable broadcastinteractive consistencyterminationcommunication complexity
Authors
Mose Mizrahi, Roger Wattenhofer
Abstract
We study $n$-party fault-tolerant consensus against general (non-threshold) adversaries. We describe an infinite family $Z_\mathsf{proj}^{n,d}$ of $Q^d$-satisfying $n$-party adversary structures based on finite projective geometry which cause error-free $R$-round protocols for interactive consistency on $L$-bit inputs to require $Ω(Ln^{2+1/d})$ bits of expected communication. Likewise, $Z_\mathsf{proj}^{n,d}$ causes error-free byzantine agreement and broadcast to cost $Ω(Ln^{1+1/d})$ bits. In every case, the lower bound is $Ω(L_{\mathsf{out}} \cdot n^{1+1/d})$ bits, where $L_{\mathsf{out}}$ is the output length. The family $Z_\mathsf{proj}^{n,d}$ also causes reliable broadcast and byzantine agreement to cost $Ω(Ln^{1+1/d})$ bits of expected communication in asynchronous networks. Moreover, there exists a related family $Z_\mathsf{2\textsf-proj}^{n,d}$ of $Q^d$-satisfying adversary structures that make core set agreement cost $Ω(Ln^{2+1/d})$ bits. These asynchronous lower bounds hold against send-omission adversaries, even if the protocol uses cryptography. Their basis is that if a quorum of non-faulty parties agree on an output and terminate, then the messages they sent before terminating must suffice for the parties outside the quorum to also terminate with the same output. Surprisingly, if we do not require the parties to terminate (stop sending messages) after they output, then these bounds no longer hold. We show this by designing a non-terminating omission-tolerant reliable broadcast protocol that can for any parameter $δ> 1$ be tuned to cost $(1 + \frac{1}{δ- 1})Ln + O(δn^2\log(δn))$ bits, which is of independent interest. Lastly, we show how to get termination with $O(Ln^{1+1/d} + n^2\log n)$ bits (assuming the $Q^d$ condition), and thus prove our asynchronous lower bounds tight.