From Runnable to Verifiable: An Independent Reproducibility Study of LLM/Agent-Driven Vulnerability Validation Artifacts

2026-08-10Cryptography and Security

Cryptography and Security
AI summary

The authors studied how often security research papers provide usable and trustworthy tools or code that prove their findings about software vulnerabilities. They found that about half the papers have public artifacts, but many of these do not fully work or reliably confirm the bugs they claim. Their tests showed that automated checks often give false signals, making it hard to trust reproductions without careful, manual validation. The authors also created a clear testing method that others can use to better evaluate security research artifacts.

security researchvulnerability workflowsartifactsreproducibility auditCVEpatched-counterfactualoraclessignal-producingvalidation pipeline
Authors
Bo Chen
Abstract
Security research artifacts---repositories, PoC exploits, and validation pipelines---are increasingly produced by LLM/agent-driven vulnerability workflows, yet the gap between \emph{publicly available}, \emph{runnable}, \emph{signal-producing}, and \emph{semantically confirmed} artifacts is poorly measured. We conduct a pre-registered reproducibility audit of this literature. A search covering 2023--2026 with dual screening yields a 104-paper consensus corpus, of which 59 papers (56.7\%) have a publicly reachable artifact. We execute an 18-paper sample at R0/R1 and all 102 cases of the anchor benchmark (arXiv:2509.24037), with patched-counterfactual verdicts on 30 signal-producing cases and matched-negative-control verdicts on 19. Three findings stand out. First, 58/102 (56.9\%) anchor cases contain a script-internal CVE identifier that diverges from the declared directory CVE. Second, only 10/18 (55.6\%) paper-level artifacts complete their declared workflow at R0, rising to 11/18 (61.1\%) after environment-only R1 repair. Third, artifact-embedded oracles prove unreliable: 20/30 patched-counterfactual audits still produce the claimed signal on the patched build, 7/19 matched negative controls still trigger on benign input, and the oracle confusion matrix has sensitivity 60\% and specificity 45\%. A trigger on the vulnerable build is not evidence of CVE-specific reproduction without a clean patched counterfactual. These are exploratory results from a pre-registered protocol, and our protocol---pre-registered post-conditions, R0/R1 repair ladder, G1--G3 semantic evidence levels, and patched-counterfactual oracles---is a reusable template for the security reproducibility community.