Regulating for AI Legitimacy
2026-07-27 • Computers and Society
Computers and SocietyArtificial Intelligence
AI summaryⓘ
The authors explain that AI systems have a lot of power, such as deciding what people see or who gets hired. While many focus on making sure AI tries to meet the right goals safely (alignment), the authors argue we also need to think about legitimacy—whether people believe the AI's power is rightful. They identify problems like AI being hard to understand, private companies having too much unapproved power, and government use of AI without clear oversight. The authors suggest laws should ensure AI rules come from trusted sources, are clear and familiar to people, and can be challenged fairly.
AI governancealignmentlegitimacyopacityprivate poweradministrative automationrule of lawpublic authorshipcontestationlegitimacy crisis
Authors
Gilad Abiri
Abstract
AI systems already govern. They rank speech and allocate attention, filter applicants and triage claims. The dominant frame for AI governance, alignment, asks whether such systems pursue the right objectives safely. It cannot answer a prior question: by what right are those objectives set and enforced? This Article argues that legitimacy is an autonomous regulatory objective, distinct from alignment and not secured by it. Legitimacy here is sociological: the belief among those subject to power that it is exercised rightfully. Performance does not produce that belief. We already have the proof of concept. Social media and search delivered enormous gains on every familiar metric and still triggered a legitimacy crisis, because publics questioned who authorized a handful of firms to set the rules of speech, visibility, and knowledge. It is possible to build a benevolent AI and still face a political crisis over its authority. The Article maps three sites where AI legitimacy falters: opacity, which blocks audiences from forming justified beliefs; private power, where firms exercise public-facing authority without recognizable authorization; and administrative automation, which strains reason-giving, participation, and review inside the state. It then asks what law can contribute. Thin legality (publicity, stability, consistent application) signals non-arbitrariness and buys real recognition, but invites legitimacy-washing when form drifts from practice. Thick legality supplies what form cannot: public authorship of the rules that bind. Three portable principles follow. Integration seats consequential AI rule-setting in venues a polity already treats as authoritative. Familiarity presents rules and reasons in locally credible forms. Contestation guarantees a credible second look with real remedies.