Decoupling Corruption and Horizon in Robust Contextual Pricing

2026-07-13Computer Science and Game Theory

Computer Science and Game Theory
AI summary

AI summary is being generated…

Authors
Matteo Castiglioni, Francesco Emanuele Stradi
Abstract
We study robust repeated contextual pricing, where valuations depends linearly on the features. At each round $t\in[T]$, a seller observes a context, posts a price, and receives only a possibly corrupted binary sale feedback. The seller knows an upper bound $C$ on the number of corrupted rounds. We design an algorithm with regret $\mathcal O(Cd+d^2\log T)$, where $d$ is the context dimension. This is the first guarantee for robust contextual pricing that separates the dependence on the corruption budget $C$ from the horizon $T$, closing the problem left open by Gupta, Guruganesh, Paes Leme, and Schneider (2025).