Guises and Perspectives: An Intentional and Hyperintensional Sketch

This paper develops a formal logic for guises based on the work of Héctor-Neri Castañeda, who understood relations from an internalist viewpoint, following Leibniz. We introduce a syntax, model theory, and proof theory for an intensional logic in which guises (taken as bundles of properties equipped with intention) serve as primary semantic objects. The system integrates (i) a Leibnizian containment semantics for singular truths, (ii) an intentional operator that captures internal relations among guises, and (iii) a modal layer for possibility and necessity modeled as maximally consistent closures. We establish core metatheoretic results (e.i. soundness and canonical-model completeness sketches) and analyze hyperintensional phenomena such as substitution failure in intentional contexts, quasi-indexicality, and de se reference. We compare the framework to classical intensional semantics (Montague), property theory (Bealer), hyperintensional logics (Fine), situation semantics (Barwise and Perry), and to the Leibniz program for a calculus of concepts. The result is a selfcontained formal framework that demonstrates that relations are not external causal links but intentional internal structures encoded in the guises through which agents and objects are conceived: i.e., they are perspectives.