Papers for

university hiring committees

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Academic effort and hiring strategies change with AI influence

Game theory of academic effort and hiring in the age of AI

Abstract: Many academic disciplines (in particular, mathematics and the theoretical sciences) face difficult questions about how to adapt their practices to the rise of highly capable artificial intelligence (AI). Before AI, a well-written research paper with a strong theoretical result acted as a reliable signal that its authors understood their field in depth. Now that AI is widely accessible, such signals have become cheaper to produce. As a result, they no longer reliably sort academics by their level of understanding. This has direct consequences for academic hiring. The age of AI raises a question for each side of the academic job market. Should an early-career researcher invest in a deep understanding of their field, or instead use AI to build a longer resume with many papers? Should a recruiter favor applicants with fewer papers who pass an interview aimed at probing understanding, or insist on both publication volume and a pass? In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model of this two-sided dilemma. We classify all pure-strategy equilibria that can arise in this game and use learning simulations to identify the behaviors that populations of applicants and recruiters may learn to adopt. Our analysis provides a framework for reasoning about how academic hiring can adapt to AI and for evaluating practices that preserve the value of deep understanding.

Mon 26 OctArtificial IntelligenceComputers and SocietyComputer Science and Game Theory
The gist
The rise of AI makes it easier to write research papers without deep understanding, which changes how academic achievements signal true expertise. The authors model the choices facing job seekers and recruiters: whether researchers should focus on true understanding or just produce many papers using AI, and whether recruiters should value interviews, publication count, or both. Their game-theory model categorizes possible stable behaviors and shows how hiring practices might evolve with AI. This helps think about preserving the value of genuine understanding in academia.
Open → 2610.35802v1

Researchers weigh journal prestige and citations equally but vary widely

The illusion of neutrality in metric-based research evaluation

Abstract: Venue prestige and citation counts are two widely used, albeit imperfect, signals of research quality. When the two signals conflict, evaluators must decide how much weight to assign each. Yet, it remains unknown how researchers across disciplines trade off these two signals when evaluating research outcome. To fill this gap, we surveyed 869 researchers using paired choices between hypothetical departmental hiring rules that assigned different weights to venue prestige and citation counts, asking which would produce better science. Among 795 respondents whose choices were largely internally consistent, choices placed nearly equal aggregate weight on the two signals. This apparent balance concealed substantial individual heterogeneity: nearly two in five respondents occupied the most venue-heavy or citation-heavy intervals. Moreover, respondents on average chose more citation-heavy rules than they believed their departments used in hiring. By revealing the subjective judgments that arise when research indicators conflict, our findings reinforce calls for greater caution when quantitative indicators are used to evaluate research.

Mon 21 SeptDigital Libraries
The gist
When deciding how good scientific work is, people often look at where it was published and how many times it’s been cited in other papers. This study asked many researchers which mattered more to them. On average, they thought both were equally important, but individuals differed a lot: some cared mostly about prestigious journals, others about citations. They also tended to value citations more than they thought their own departments did.
Open → 2609.24471v1