traffic safety analysts

Abstract: Crash datasets that carry an investigator narrative hold information the coded fields omit. Coding those narratives at scale has been blocked by three obstacles. Frontier large language models are costly at that scale, their generated text cannot be verified, and no rule says how much output a human must check. This paper formulates narrative coding as gated, typed decisions answered by Jev, a System One model that returns probabilities over analyst-defined options and generates no text. A screen covered 499,500 Texas narratives and 195,857 were coded with a 27-question schema. Cost is governed by schema size rather than narrative length. The probabilities are audited against coded fields and against 2,416 blinded human judgments drawn under a stated sampling design. Two frontier large language models are benchmarked on the same records. Against human labels the typed model attains an F1 of 0.908. One frontier model gains 0.059 and the other is indistinguishable from it. Calibration varies by model rather than by paradigm, so each model must be audited. Recalibration on the same labels reduces calibration error by a factor of 3.3. Agreement with coded fields understates fidelity to the narrative by a median of 0.26 in kappa. A resolution-floor bound covers any model that reports probabilities on a discrete grid. A review budget over flagged records gives the records a human must read per variable and per year. Adding the calibrated variables to the coded fields raises the injury and fatal crashes attributed to nine factors by 10,747 per year.

Abstract: Crash-severity models inform screening, dispatch and site prioritization, yet are deployed without a finite-sample statement of what one prediction means. Off-the-shelf guarantees fail here, because the features that make crash severity distinctive defeat them: the KABCO outcome is ordinal, the recorded label is a field assessment agreeing with medical severity about half the time, erring in a structured way, and deployment crosses jurisdictions and years calibration never saw. We develop a certification layer that wraps any severity model unmodified, with distribution-free guarantees using this structure: contiguous ordinal sets that read as "B or worse"; per-class validity for any pre-declared partition, with an oracle efficiency characterization; transfer of coverage to unobserved true severity through a declared reporting band, with a worst-case sharpness result; a one-sided certificate under deployment shift; and severity-weighted risk control. The guarantees compose with an attributable slack budget. The same analysis bounds what certification can achieve. A certified set's informativeness is governed by a functional of the true law that no base model can evade and that cannot be lower-bounded distribution-free; given a declared misreporting channel identified from record-linkage data, a nonvacuous lower bound on that floor becomes computable. On 5.2 million Texas records across seven base models spanning four decades, the layer attaches identical validity and certifies, on the vulnerable road users, a model-independent floor on set width that no base model beats, separating it from a remainder that stays bounded but distribution-free unidentifiable. The framework is released as an open-source package with theorem-level tests.