software package maintainers

Abstract: Modern software development increasingly relies on using multiple programming languages. Some software packages are published to multiple package ecosystems such as NPM for JavaScript and PyPI for Python. Little is known about cross-ecosystem packages, especially regarding how they are structured. In this paper, we conduct a large-scale empirical study of over six million packages across six major ecosystems to understand 1) how prevalent cross-ecosystem packages are among all packages, 2) whether there are distinct source code architectural patterns that cross-ecosystem packages use, and 3) whether there are correlations between architectural patterns and project health metrics from GitHub. Results indicate that cross-ecosystem packages constitute a small but important, growing fraction of packages. We identify five distinct architectural patterns. For example, packages that implement code generation from a shared source file or use language bindings are associated with significantly higher community visibility and development activity. Based on our findings, we provide implications for package adopters, maintainers, and researchers. We envision our taxonomy being used for future investigations into several aspects of software development, such as the trade-offs between focusing on one language and translating to other languages using bindings, templating, and wrappers, versus using native code and native functions to support additional languages.

Abstract: The software supply chain has become an increasingly exposed attack surface because of its reliance on intricate yet fragile dependencies. Existing defenses such as GitHub Dependabot often raise many false alerts because their coarse-grained matching cannot determine whether a vulnerable dependency is actually exploitable. Security analysts typically spend substantial time assessing vulnerability exploitability case by case. Recent LLM agents have emerged as promising candidates for this task given their advanced capabilities in coding and cybersecurity, yet no existing benchmark evaluates them on it. Prior benchmarks target zero-day settings, where agents detect and exploit previously unknown vulnerabilities. In contrast, software supply chain security focuses on how known vulnerabilities in upstream dependencies affect downstream projects. This requires agents to reason across repositories and determine whether an upstream vulnerability is exploitable in the downstream project. To address this gap, we introduce VEX-Bench, the first benchmark for evaluating LLM agents' ability to assess the exploitability of software supply chain vulnerabilities. It contains 75 real-world cases mined from GitHub and labeled by security experts, covering Python, Java, and Go. We evaluate nine models across three agent harnesses. While GPT-5.5 and Claude Opus 4.6 reach approximately 80% F1 on binary vulnerability-status classification, only GPT-5.5 surpasses 70% macro-F1 on fine-grained justification classification. This gap highlights the challenge of moving beyond binary exploitability assessment to identifying fine-grained exploitability reasons. Code and data: https://github.com/steven1518/vex-bench