software developers building ai assistants

Abstract: Self-evolving runtime harnesses can substantially improve the capabilities of large language model (LLM) agents and provide a promising paradigm for optimizing agent execution. Existing harness evolution methods typically rely on iterative search, repeatedly evaluating and revising candidate harnesses based on execution feedback from task instances. While this paradigm enables continuous harness optimization, it incurs substantial time overhead due to repeated agent executions and code modifications, and may overfit to observed tasks and specific failure patterns, resulting in degraded generalization to unseen tasks. We identify the lack of principled failure diagnosis as a key bottleneck in harness evolution: an observed failure can reflect either model-specific deficiencies or systematic harness deficiencies, and directly optimizing against individual failures can lead to unnecessary model-specific accommodation. We therefore propose Ecdysis, an efficient and effective framework that distinguishes model-specific accommodation from harness-level repair and biases adaptation toward systematic harness deficiencies by identifying recurring cross-task failure patterns. Ecdysis adopts a batch-level cross-instance failure aggregation paradigm to jointly analyze failure evidence from multiple task instances and further introduces Failure-Driven Collaborative Refinement to diagnose failure causes and iteratively refine harness modification specifications. By combining cross-instance failure analysis with multi-role diagnosis, Ecdysis enables more effective harness evolution with lower training time. Experiments show that Ecdysis achieves up to a 1.84x speedup in harness training compared with existing harness evolution methods, while improving the reasoning accuracy of the resulting harnesses by 18.56%.

Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise for translating Natural Language (NL) planning descriptions into PDDL problem instances. However, standard evaluation criteria such as syntactic validity or planner success can substantially overestimate faithfulness to the described task: a generated problem may be parseable and solvable while misrepresenting the intended initial state, goal, object structure, or optimization target. This paper studies an end-to-end NL-to-PDDL pipeline that combines LLM generation, checks in terms of PDDL parsing, planning and validation, a domain-conformance checker, an LLM critic, and iterative repair. Fine-grained repair feedback is constructed from the domain description, the generated problem, the natural language problem description, and operational diagnostics. Reference-based comparisons against curated benchmark PDDL problem descriptions are used for post-hoc benchmark analysis, and these offline checks include renaming-invariant structural matching and semantic equivalence, where domain support is available. Across Planetarium, AutoPlanBench, and curated PDDL~2.1 problems, results show that operational success and benchmark-reference reconstruction can diverge substantially. Results also show that structured repair can be useful, and that PDDL~2.1 remains challenging for reference reconstruction, even when operational success improves.

Abstract: LLM agents complete tasks by issuing sequences of tool calls, and every observation they read is a channel through which an indirect prompt injection can enter. A successful injection has a characteristic shape when the trajectory is read in order: a benign prefix gives way to actions that serve the attacker rather than the user. Existing benchmarks measure whether such attacks succeed against live agents, and existing guard models judge a trace as a whole; no public corpus labels, step by step, where an injection enters a trajectory and which steps it corrupts. We present AgentDrift, a benchmark of 12,536 synthetic tool-call trajectories over five agent domains in which every one of the 71,024 steps carries one of four labels: benign, injection point, hijacked, or failed injection. The corpus contains 4,000 benign, 5,536 attacked, 1,500 failed-attack, and 1,500 hard-negative trajectories; attacked trajectories follow three compliance patterns whose label strings obey a stated regular grammar. Failed attacks carry an injection the agent resisted, and hard negatives carry legitimate content that resembles an attack, so a detector must separate attempt from success and deviation from novelty. Trajectories were generated by a single open model under category-specific protocols, enforced by a closed-vocabulary structural validator, screened by an LLM judge, and audited by hand on 1,200 trajectories; we show that the LLM judge was itself fooled by the hard negatives. A surface-feature logistic regression recovers only 55.4% of attacks (F1 0.647), including only 8.2% of partial hijacks and 23.1% of delayed executions, so nearly half of the attacks require modeling the behavioral sequence. We measure template concentration, attack-goal-family collapse, and world-identity leakage in the generated data, and release the corpus with its documentation under CC BY 4.0.