Network Topology Shapes AI Intervention Effectiveness on Deception: Truth-Telling vs. Investigative Agents
Abstract: Deploying AI agents to combat dishonest communication is an intuitive response to deception in hybrid human-AI societies. However, the efficacy of such interventions in realistic networked settings remains unclear. We study this problem using an evolutionary game-theoretic model of the Deceiver's Game by extending it to structured networks, where agents can adopt deception, truth-telling, and investigation strategies. We introduce committed AI agents (zealots) fixed to either truth-telling or investigative strategies and conduct agent-based simulations across three network topologies. Our key findings are: (1) passive committed truth-telling agents can amplify adaptive deception by creating exploitable honest partners, whereas investigative agents increase adaptive truth-telling in the oscillatory regime; (2) intervention effects are non-monotonic in deployment density because committed agents reshape rather than simply suppress the underlying oscillatory dynamics; and (3) response peaks depend on topology, with sampled scale-free populations showing sharp low-density responses and fully connected populations requiring larger committed fractions. Overall, the results highlight the need to distinguish passive truth-telling from active investigation when using committed agents to influence networked deception dynamics.