Papers for
smart grid operators
Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.
AI training adjusts to renewable energy limits using game theory
A Game-Theoretic Framework for Incentive-Compatible AI training Under Renewable-Energy Constraints
Abstract: As artificial intelligence systems increasingly rely on distributed and collaborative training, the energy footprint of these processes becomes a shared responsibility. Modern AI training often unfolds across heterogeneous compute nodes-ranging from cloud clusters to edge devices-whose energy availability is spatially and temporally variable. At the same time, renewable energy grids experience growing levels of excess generation, creating opportunities to align computational workloads with low-carbon energy supply. In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model of carbon-aware AI training in which autonomous agents strategically choose whether to participate and how intensively to train under limited renewable energy availability. Each agent balances diminishing learning returns, rewards for remaining within green-energy budgets, and penalties for grid consumption. While our framework applies broadly to distributed AI training, we examine Federated Learning as a representative case study due to its decentralized structure and flexible scheduling. We analyze equilibrium existence, efficiency, and adaptive dynamics, and provide simulation evidence that appropriately designed incentives can eliminate grid-based energy usage while preserving model performance. Our findings demonstrate how incentive-compatible training mechanisms can enhance energy efficiency and sharply reduce carbon emissions under renewable-energy constraints.
New method controls online learning under noisy constraints reliably
Constrained Online Learning with Noisy Constraint Values
Abstract: We study constrained online convex optimization with adversarial constraints when constraint values and gradients are observed through unbiased noise. Gaussian value noise of standard deviation $σ$ yields a worst-case lower bound of $Ω(\min\{σ,1\}T/\log^7T)$ on the maximum of expected regret and expected hard violation, even with known gradients. This rules out any jointly $O(T^{1-δ})$ guarantee for fixed $δ>0$ and fixed positive noise level. We therefore study budget violation: the largest cumulative overspend over any window within a fixed horizon. We introduce \LEDGER, which tracks observed net consumption in a nonnegative balance and sets constraint weights before the current feedback noise. Under common feasibility and conditional finite-variance feedback, for fixed problem parameters, \LEDGER\ achieves $O(\sqrt T/V)$ expected regret and $O(\sqrt V\,T^{3/4}+σ\sqrt T)$ expected budget violation for $V\in[T^{-1/2},1]$. This gives the pair $(O(\sqrt T),O(T^{3/4}))$ at $V=1$ and $(O(T^{2/3}),O(T^{2/3}))$ at $V=T^{-1/6}$, without a Slater condition. The budget-focused endpoint $V=T^{-1/2}$ gives $(O(T),O(\sqrt T))$. The same update yields $O((1+E[P_T])\sqrt T/V)$ expected dynamic regret for predictable feasible comparator paths, without common feasibility or path-length input. Its budget bound instead depends on the shortest feasible path, up to a dimension factor.