Dynamic Coalition Formation Under Capacity Constraints: A Regime-Switching Value-Investing Game
Abstract: Edge computing service deployment requires the Network Operator (NO) and Service Providers (SPs) to coordinate investment and resource allocation under uncertain demand. This paper develops an audit-based service management framework for daily coalition formation with fixed capacity and service-level agreement (SLA) reservations. A two-stage coalitional game separates infrastructure investment from operational participation. Demand follows a Geometric Random Walk (GRW), and SPs apply an ordered admission and suspension rule using reported marginal contributions. With the NO held fixed, the operational coalition value is submodular; mandatory reservations can produce negative Shapley payoffs. We derive a separable benchmark, compute operational Shapley allocations, and give a sufficient condition for convergence to an individual equilibrium. A probabilistic audit mechanism provides a conditional daily truthfulness guarantee under verified settlement and enforceable penalties. For five service classes over three years, the reference run gains 12.4% over static grand-coalition membership and recovers 94.6% of the full-information optimum. Across 30 runs, the median gain is 13.3%. Sensitivity tests examine policy parameters, capacity and alternative demand models. The gain depends on capacity and update order; abundant capacity can make the admission rule underperform static membership.