Papers for

security automation engineers

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

AI helps find real cloud security threats across major providers

Validating AI-Discovered Cloud Threats on Live Infrastructure: A Multi-Model, Multi-Cloud Study

Abstract: Cloud infrastructure threat modeling lacks empirical validation of AI-discovered threats. We present a three-phase methodology of multi-agent threat discovery, automated exploit synthesis, and non-destructive live validation, and apply it to three commercial foundation models on two cloud architectures, validating each threat natively on the cloud (AWS, GCP, or Azure) it was discovered against. Of 233 AI-discovered threats, 103 were confirmed and 34 refuted (75.2\% precision, 95\% CI [67.3, 81.7]); 44 were conditional (the named mechanism refuted but an equivalent impact shown through another path) and 52 indeterminate. Multi-model discovery helped through breadth, not agreement: the three models together found 2.2$\times$ the confirmed threats of the best single model at comparable precision, while threats reported by several models were confirmed no more often than single-model ones. False positives were not architecture-specific: they asserted access or system state the deployment did not have. Threats coded in advance as observable configuration resolved cleanly more often than multi-step behavioral threats (72.5\% vs.\ 51.6\%), which were more often conditional, suggesting that models more often misidentify the exploitation mechanism than the underlying weakness. AI-assisted discovery is a practical input to security workflows when paired with empirical validation.

Sat 7 NovCryptography and Security
The gist
Cloud security teams want better ways to find real threats in complex systems. The authors tested AI tools that suggest cloud security weaknesses, then tried out these threats safely on live cloud setups like AWS and Google Cloud. They confirmed about 75% of AI-suggested threats and found that using several AI models together finds more real issues than using just one. This shows AI can assist security checks when combined with actual tests on real cloud systems.
Open → 2611.10947v1

Verified formal policies adapt safely for lifelong AI agent guardrails

VEPA: Verified Evolving Formal Policy for Lifelong LLM Agent Guardrails

Abstract: LLM agents increasingly operate over sensitive resources, such as private documents and mutable system states, which can create serious safety and security risks. Runtime guardrails should therefore make inspectable, reproducible, and deterministic allow or refuse decisions before potentially irreversible agent actions are executed. However, safety and security requirements are rarely complete before deployment, so guardrails need to keep adapting as new risks emerge. Existing adaptive guardrails learn from deployment experience, but they usually apply safety policies through LLM inference, which can lead to inconsistent decisions and ambiguous policy interpretations. Formal guardrails, on the other hand, enforce policies deterministically, but they usually rely on pre-deployment or task-specific policies and have no mechanism to adapt to newly observed risks. We introduce VEPA, a framework for the verified evolution of formal agent guardrails. VEPA represents the guardrail as a formal policy of executable symbolic rules over typed agent events. During deployment, we use an LLM guided by deployment feedback to propose policy patches that fix newly observed failures while preserving previously correct behavior. Then, a deterministic verifier only accepts policies that are structurally valid and conflict-free. Finally, an evidence-aware authority layer activates a verified rule only when it has enough supporting evidence, so uncertain updates cannot directly affect guardrail decisions. Across ASSEBench-Safety, ASSEBench-Security, and ATBench, VEPA consistently outperforms baselines while expanding the scope of deterministic formal-policy enforcement. These gains also hold under more challenging deployment conditions, including mixed streams, corrupted feedback, and longer horizons.

Thu 8 OctArtificial IntelligenceComputation and LanguageCryptography and Security
The gist
Large language model (LLM) agents often handle sensitive information where wrong actions can cause serious problems. Existing safety systems either adapt through inconsistent AI guesses or use strict rules that cannot change after deployment. The authors propose VEPA, a system that evolves formal safety rules using AI suggestions checked by a verifier to catch conflicts and ensure decisions remain clear and reliable. This approach allows the safety guardrails to improve over time while preventing uncertain updates from causing risky behavior.
Open → 2610.12813v1

Automated attack graph creation aids efficient vulnerability detection

Automating Attack Graph Construction for Agentic Pentesting. Towards Neuro-Symbolic Vulnerability Hunting

Abstract: Logic attack graphs grounded in scanner output provide explicit and auditable attack path reasoning LLM-based agents lack. Integrating symbolic frameworks such as MulVAL to contemporary security workflows or agentic pipelines, however, requires translating scanner evidence to initial facts, and creating domain-specific rules. We present a semi-automated pipeline that addresses this interoperability problem and depict its feasibility in a web-security case study. Our pipeline parses findings from Trivy, Semgrep, and Nmap into MulVAL predicates and uses an LLM-assisted process to construct domain-specific Datalog rules linking scanner-detectable evidence to attack techniques. MulVAL/XSB then performs symbolic inference to generate structured attack paths. We evaluate the attack-graph construction infrastructure on 54 web Capture-the-Flag tasks from CyBench within an agentic pipeline (Hybrid Reasoner); we do not evaluate the performance of the downstream agent. Every task produced at least one goal-reaching graph, and we achieve mean ground-truth vulnerability coverage of 53.7%, with 51.9% achieving full coverage; mean noise-path rate was 83.9%. With median end-to-end time of 24.9 s (MulVAL reasoning: 2.7 s) the pipeline is feasible and runtime-practical for agentic workflows, but predicate coverage, rule coverage, and path precision remain limiting factors. Next steps include semantic rule validation and agent-level comparison for graph-guided pentesting.

Mon 14 SeptCryptography and SecurityArtificial Intelligence
The gist
Finding all the weak spots hackers might use to break into a website is complicated. The authors created a system that turns security scanner reports into clear, step-by-step paths of how an attacker might succeed. This system uses a mix of computer logic tools and artificial intelligence to build these paths automatically. Their tests on web security challenges showed it can find over half of the known vulnerabilities efficiently, helping security teams better understand potential attacks.
Open → 2609.15523v1