Papers for

resource allocation engineers

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Improved limits for fair division of indivisible items among agents

Improved Impossibility Bounds for Maximin Share Allocations

Abstract: The maximin share (MMS) is a central fairness benchmark for allocating indivisible items, but it need not be simultaneously attainable even under additive preferences. While extensive work has developed approximation guarantees, quantitative impossibility bounds have received comparatively little attention. We establish improved asymptotic and constant impossibility bounds for both goods and chores. For every sufficiently large number $n$ of agents, we construct additive goods instances in which every allocation gives some agent at most a $1-Ω((\log n)^{-2})$ fraction of her MMS. This strengthens the $1/n^4$ shortfall of Feige, Sapir, and Tauber (2021) to an inverse-polylogarithmic shortfall, an exponential improvement on the logarithmic scale of $n$. For chores, we construct instances in which every allocation gives some agent cost at least a $1+Ω((\log n)^{-2})$ factor of her MMS. Consequently, for every fixed $\varepsilon>0$, guarantees of $1-O(n^{-\varepsilon})$ for goods and $1+O(n^{-\varepsilon})$ for chores are impossible. We also give four-agent, eleven-item instances that improve the universal impossibility bounds from $39/40$ to $20/21$ for goods and from $44/43$ to $31/30$ for chores.

Mon 14 SeptComputer Science and Game Theory
The gist
Fairly dividing indivisible items among many people is tricky because sometimes no perfect solution exists. This paper shows stronger mathematical limits on how close any allocation can get to a fair benchmark called maximin share (MMS) for both desirable items (goods) and undesirable tasks (chores). The authors demonstrate that as the number of people grows, the shortfall from perfect fairness worsens in a specific, predictable way. They also improve exact bounds for smaller cases with four people and eleven items.
Open 2609.15085v1

Pmms fairness does not always exist but guarantees hold for additive chores

Non-Existence of PMMS Allocations and a $4/3$-PMMS Guarantee for Additive Chores

Abstract: We study pairwise maximin share (PMMS) fairness for indivisible items with additive preferences. We give a polynomial-time reduction from chores to goods that preserves the existence of a PMMS allocation. Together with known nonexistence results for chores, this yields nonexistence for additive goods. In addition, we show that deciding if a given instance admits a PMMS allocation is NP-hard. We also give explicit instances whose PMMS factors are $226/227$ for goods and $1.102065$ for chores, certified by exact enumeration. Complementing these impossibility results, we prove that every additive-chore instance admits a $4/3$-PMMS allocation.

Wed 9 SeptComputer Science and Game Theory
The gist
Sometimes when dividing things that people dislike, called chores, it’s impossible to make everyone as fairly treated as a certain fairness measure called pairwise maximin share (PMMS) demands. The authors found a way to show that this difficulty also applies when dividing goods that people want. They proved that deciding if a perfectly fair PMMS allocation is possible is a hard problem to solve by a computer. Still, they showed that for chores, there is a way to make an allocation that is fairly close to the PMMS standard, within a factor of 4/3.
Open 2609.10493v1