Papers for

protocol developers

Papers whose findings have a practical use for this group, as judged from the abstract. Open a paper to read what it means in practice.

Session type state spaces form lattices with useful properties

Session Type State Spaces Form Lattices

Abstract: We prove that the state space of every well-formed session type, quotiented by strongly connected components, forms a bounded lattice; n-ary parallel composition yields product lattices. Two consequences follow: duality preserves the lattice up to isomorphism, and Gay-Hole width subtyping corresponds to lattice embedding for non-recursive types. We validate this on 108 benchmark protocols across networking, databases, distributed systems, AI, and fault tolerance: all form lattices, 93 distributive, 15 non-distributive. Mechanised in Lean 4 with two independently developed tool implementations.

Mon 28 SeptProgramming LanguagesLogic in Computer Science
The gist
The authors found that the possible states of communication protocols, called session types, can be organized into a mathematical structure known as a bounded lattice. This structure helps understand how protocols combine and relate to each other. They tested their discovery on many real-world protocols from fields like networking and AI, confirming the pattern. Their findings also clarify how certain operations preserve these structures and relate to protocol subtyping.
Open → 2609.34927v1

Safe message forwarding preserves communication properties in composed systems

Safe Composition of CFSM Systems via Partial Gateways

Abstract: The Participants-as-Interfaces (PaI) methodology for system composition proposes that system participants can be regarded as interfaces. For each system in a given collection, one participant is designated to serve as its interface. When the systems are composed, these interface participants are replaced with gateways that communicate with one another by forwarding messages. We generalise the approach to partial gateways, where gateways can forward only a chosen set of messages. As for the standard PaI approach, we exploit such extended version for systems of communicating finite state machines (CFSMs). This extension is fully detailed for the binary case, and can be scaled up to the multicomposition case. We prove that many relevant communication properties (deadlock-freeness, reception-error-freeness, etc.) are preserved by PaI composition via partial gateways in case also the connection policy (i.e. the system representing the way we wish gateways interact with each other) enjoys the same properties. Such a proof turns out to be just a corollary of a property preservation result for a restricted and partial composition method, dubbed fusion-composition. Fusion-composition hence turns out to be at the heart of the PaI composition approach.

Mon 28 SeptLogic in Computer Science
The gist
When combining multiple communicating systems, one challenge is ensuring they work correctly without problems like deadlocks or message errors. The authors show a way to connect parts of these systems using special components called partial gateways that only forward selected messages. They prove that if the original systems and the connection policy are safe, then the composed system also remains safe. This finding helps build larger systems by safely linking smaller ones through controlled message forwarding.
Open → 2609.34922v1

No single peer can fully verify post-quantum security delivery

Nothing Breaks: No Single Peer Can Soundly Gate Post-Quantum Delivery

Abstract: Post-quantum protection is delivered to a peer, not declared in a file: whether a session is quantum-resistant is a relation between a server's configuration and the clients that reach it. We show that no single peer can soundly gate that relation. Shipped SSH clients are not ordered: two of their post-quantum capability classes are minimal and incomparable, so a check pinned to either misses the other family's withdrawal. A peer taking both fares no better: it falls back and misses both, or, where classical outranks one family, catches just that one. No case flags both. Nothing above the wire carries the relation either. An artifact-side instrument cannot encode it, because a peer population is not one of its inputs; and across seven configurations on two protocols we find that not one of the five scalars deployed auditors expose to automation moves, while unrelated degradation moves the ones that discriminate at all: the auditors do compute the delivered algorithm, and discard it at the interface automation reads. Nothing else catches the loss either, because nothing breaks: removing a hybrid key exchange starts the daemon, validates the configuration, passes the tests and serves the client, and the adversary it defends against does not exist yet, so no functional signal can carry the loss even in principle. We then show that agents make that state reachable at scale, driving a validated downgrade in 40 of 40 episodes from ordinary engineering prose, against 0 of 40 on a matched neutral document.

Mon 7 SeptCryptography and Security
The gist
The authors found that it's impossible for a single computer or device to reliably confirm whether a connection is truly protected against future quantum computers. Different security tools or clients have capabilities that don’t completely cover each other, so checks by individual devices miss some risks. They also show that flaws go unnoticed because services keep running and tests pass even when quantum protections are removed. This means current methods cannot catch or signal some types of post-quantum security downgrades.
Open → 2609.07849v1